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Introduction 
 
This paper is about the complex relationship between oil and armed conflict and the role of 
the national and local state, multinational corporations, armed and civil actors. It focuses on 
the Department of Casanare, Colombia, where one of the largest discoveries of crude oil 
reserves in Latin America in two decades was made in 1991. It uses data from three field trips 
by the author in 1997, 2001 and 2002. It draws on other primary research on the impact of oil 
discoveries in the neighbouring Department of Arauca in the 1980s.  The paper is a case study 
which illustrates the importance of detailed, empirically-based research and analysis as a 
complement to conceptual propositions in the field of resource and conflict studies. It 
contributes to the discussion on responses of multinational oil corporations to the complexity 
of contemporary armed conflict and why and how one corporation, British Petroleum, began 
to look “beyond the perimeter fence”. 
 
A number of interesting propositions have been put forward in recent years by economists 
working on the complex correlations between resources and conflict and within these, the 
particular role of oil in conflict. A consensus is emerging that natural resources and conflict 
are positively correlated1. Additionally, some argue that opportunity rather than motivation 
can account for the existence of either for-profit or not-for-profit rebels2, and that oil as a non-
lootable but obstructable commodity is likely to increase the duration and intensity of 
conflicts3. These propositions need further exploration through case studies. The emphasis of 
this case study is that it was not inevitable that oil should play the role it has ended up playing 
in the Colombian conflict. There were contingent contextual moments when appropriate 
action might have prevented the transformation or intensification of conflict as a result of the 
presence of oil. This chapter identifies some of those key moments in two oil-rich regions of 
Colombia: Arauca and Casanare. It argues that policy failure can account for opportunity as 
much as the presence of the resource4.  
 
Colombia, unlike many regions of the South where oil is found, has a relatively sophisticated 
level of institutionality, a constitutional framework and a significant middle class and 
professional sector. It therefore offers possibilities for action which are inconceivable in some 
contexts. Once the predation capacity of armed groups reaches a certain point, patterns of 
conflict can be transformed very rapidly beyond the control of even the most sophisticated 
policy interventions. The challenge is whether it is possible to prevent the rise of organised 
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predation through extortion before it becomes more the norm than the exercise of authority by 
civilian institutions, and in turn contaminates and undermines those institutions.5  
 
This case study of Casanare illustrates the dilemmas that confront multinational oil companies 
when they enter a region without full knowledge and understanding of the socio-political 
environmental context. They can contribute unwittingly to the escalation of the predatory 
dynamics already in play as a result of prior policy failure. In the course of the 1990s, oil 
companies operating in Colombia have been forced to acknowledge the importance of these 
socio-political environmental factors and seek options for manoeuvre in the midst of 
deepening violence. British Petroleum in Casanare was one of the first to recognise that they 
needed to recognise early mistakes and look “beyond the perimeter fence”.  
 
The case of BP in Casanare illustrates the shift that has begun to take place, albeit unevenly, 
in multinational oil company thinking and behaviour. It illustrates how one multinational oil 
company is confronting and adapting to the instability and dangers of extraction in the post-
Cold War world. This in turn raises issues around local-nation state-global economic 
dynamics.  In regions once known as the “Third World”, the state and nation building project 
remained incomplete just as economic forces were liberated from the direction of the state 
both in ideological/discursive as well as real policy terms. The dominant economic 
philosophy has since been to stress the positive contribution to national and global economic 
growth when markets allocate resources freely and the private sector pursues its interests 
without interference. Subsequent thinking has brought the state back into the picture for 
governance purposes, but the task of “good governance” has proved very elusive in contexts 
where the normative basis for co-existence in a territory are weakly developed ie there is no 
positive value invested in building the conditions for living together.  The failure of the 
national and local state in Colombia to build, promote and defend a basis for co-existence, 
allowed the oil resource of first Arauca and then Casanare to interact with its socio-political 
environment in a way that contributed to decomposition rather than articulation of social 
forces around a governance project. Ineffective and undemocratic local, national and 
international regulatory institutions do not foster legal forms of economic accumulation and 
much less so in situations of war6.The lack of a central redistributive authority acting in a 
recognisable sense in terms of the “common good” of the society, has had a profoundly 
negative impact on conflict in the South.7and in Casanare enabled oil to contribute to the 
multipolar militarization of the territory rather than its integration around a development 
project for the good of everyone. 
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In situations like these, multinational companies in the extractive sector where location is 
determined less by the market but by the terrain and its mineral deposits, have to adapt or face 
the consequences. Unwilling to get dragged into complex political and violent environments, 
many have chosen the easier route of appeasement through dollars with few questions asked. 
Oil multinationals have often relied on this approach and/or a local militarised state to provide 
stability at whatever cost in human rights. International monitoring has begun to make this a 
very costly path in terms of public relations and image, while national armies, where they 
exist, have proved less and less effective in the face of self-financing armed groups8 .  The 
more difficult route has been to explore the world “beyond the perimeter fence” in a serious 
way and to develop policies that will involve engagement in that risky environment. The 
danger is of slipping through default into “state-like roles”9. Should or can a multinational oil 
company, accountable not to the citizens of the country of operation but to overseas 
shareholders and for its economic not political performance, take this path? Is it the only one 
available and what can it deliver in terms of a multinational’s goals and objectives? The BP 
corporate responsibility programme in Casanare, Colombia, is a systematic and strategic 
approach to extracting oil in the midst of violent conflict and one of the most innovative 
available. It enables us to explore some of these questions. 
 
The first part of this paper will focus on the role of oil in the political economy of war in 
Colombia and how it should be analysed in relationship to the Colombian armed conflict. It 
will do this through the national picture as well as the local picture in Arauca, the home of the 
Caño Limón field and pipeline, and a more detailed study of Casanare, where the Cusiana-
Cupiagua bonanza is located and which has seen the growth of armed conflict throughout the 
1990s. The second part will explore how BP strove to overcome its early mistakes in 
Casanare. This will show how the multinational responded to criticisms of its role in the 
region and developed a sophisticated programme of engagement with the socio-political 
reality around it based on ethical principles and commitments. The chapter will ask whether 
this case-study is anything more than a particular response to a particularly complex situation, 
or whether it is paradigmatic of the dilemmas facing oil multinationals in the increasingly 
common context of weak or collapsed states in poor, war-torn economies of the South. It will 
argue that rather than focus our attention only on the dynamics of the economisation of 
conflict, we should also look at actions that might at different contingent moments in 
particular contexts have prevented or could mitigate this economisation. Predatory and 
militarised dynamics often provoke and are used in turn to justify, escalating militarised 
responses from the state which drag in international actors where the state is too weak. This is 
happening today through US government training and financing of the Colombian pipeline 
protection brigade. Such responses also cost the lives of civilians and can seriously impede 
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their participation in democratic state-building and ultimately the protection of civil over 
uncivil social dynamics. At present, the Colombian oil industry and BP has begun to see 
security in terms of what happens beyond as well as behind the perimeter fence. An effective 
judiciary able to defend citizens rights is more of a guarantor of security than a cordon of 
heavily armed soldiers with a poor human rights record. Can this vision be sustained against 
the argument for military solutions? 
 
The Dynamics of  “Boon and Burden”: Oil and the 
Political Economy of War in Colombia 
 
“Over almost a century and a half, oil has brought out both the best and worst of our 
civilization. It has been both boon and burden. Energy is the basis of industrial 
society. And of all energy sources, oil has loomed the largest and the most 
problematic because of its central role, its strategic character, its geographic 
distribution, the recurrent pattern of crisis in its supply – and the inevitable and 
irresistible temptation to grasp for its rewards….Its history has been a panorama of 
triumphs and a litany of tragic and costly mistakes. It has been a theatre for the noble 
and the base in the human character. Creativity, dedication, entrepreneurship, 
ingenuity and technical innovation have coexisted with avarice, corruption, blind 
political ambition and brute force…Much blood has been spilt in its name. The fierce 
and sometimes violent quest for oil – and for the riches and power it conveys – will 
surely continue so long as oil holds a central place” 10
 
 
OIL AND CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA: THE BACKGROUND 
 
Oil and conflict have attracted each other in Colombia since the 1920s when oil workers 
confronted the US Tropical Oil Company and in 1923 founded their trade union, the 
Unión Sindical Obrera (USO). The USO workers launched what became a mythic 
struggle both to defend their labour rights but also the right to discuss and propose on the 
way Colombia’s oil should be exploited and its energy policy developed. Between the 
founding of the Union and the Second National Oil Congress in April 200211, the USO 
has represented a militant, politically active workforce, whose struggle to defend the 
national interest has cost many oil workers lives12.  
 
The USO played a leading role in the late 1940s when Tropical’s De Mares concession 
was about to run out, to ensure that it reverted to the State. This is what happened, and in 
1951, the State Industrial and Commercial Oil Company, Empresa Colombiana de 
Petroleos (ECOPETROL) began operations.The debate around the appropriate 
relationship between the state oil company and foreign oil multinationals has raged ever 
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since. But the stakes in the debate were raised exponentially when in August 1984 
Mannesmann AG, a German company, was contracted to build a 184 mile pipeline from 
the new Caño Limon field to the trans-Andean crude oil pipeline at Rio Zulia by the first 
week of December 1985, a huge challenge. Three months after the work began, the 
company suffered the first of four guerrilla attacks on their installation. In the course of 
this and subsequent attacks, four employees were killed, four kidnapped and a series of 
local civic strikes were organised in the Sarare region of Arauca, an important base of the 
ELN guerrillas13. Mannesmann gave in despite public denials14, and Occidental agreed to 
allocate an annual sum to the Church for social projects. From then on, the ELN began to 
harass other oil companies exploring in the area. The payments from these and from 
Occidental, enabled the guerrillas both to increase their fighting force and their political 
influence in the area. At the end of 1986 it launched a campaign entitled: “Awake 
Colombia…they are stealing the oil” and between early 1988 and mid 1989 damage to the 
pipeline cost the government an estimate US$400 million in lost oil revenues15. It agreed 
to halt the attacks on the pipeline after the Minister of Mines was forced to resign and the 
government agreed to the First Energy Forum in 1989.  
 
The precedent had, however, been set. Oil was a potentially very lucrative source of 
revenue for the armed struggle at the same time as the nationalist case provided a 
legitimizing discourse for this form of extortion. By bombing the pipeline, the ELN also 
claimed it was representing the interests of the local communities as the aim was to make 
the company pay for social programmes in the area.  The nationalist case was a real 
concern for many on the legal left who were ambivalent towards or completely rejected 
the armed struggle, thus confusing what was for many a genuine cause with an 
unacceptable means to pursue it16. The following sections will distinguish the two ways in 
which oil plays a role in the Colombian conflict. Firstly, as part of the nationalist debate, 
both a real and valid discussion for Colombians and as a legitimizing discourse for armed 
action. Secondly, it will analyse the role of oil as a generator of income for waging war, a 
role that escalated hugely in the course of the 1990s. It will then explore the two most 
important oil producing regions of Colombia over the last two decades. It will trace how 
oil interacted with other social and political dynamics, and argue that action could have 
been taken to prevent oil becoming such a major player in Colombia’s armed conflict. 
 
OIL AND THE NATIONALIST DEBATE 
 
This discussion will not attempt to adjudicate on this debate, but to show why it has been 
such an important legitimizing discourse for attacks on the oil industry.  The reason, it is 
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argued, is that there are genuinely contentious issues about energy policy and the 
aspiration, most cogently articulated and defended by the oil workers union, to promote 
an energy policy able to meet national and social needs. In an interview in March 1988, I 
spoke with Pedro Galindo, at the time a spokesman for FEDEPETROL, the federation of 
all the oil workers organisations. He argued: 
 
“We are an immensely rich country in natural resources, in gas, in coal, in oil and 
water. But by the end of the century there will be a million peasant houses without 
light….We must use our natural resources not in terms of how many dollars it will 
generate for us, but in terms of how many jobs and how much industrial development 
they will bring…We believe that the energy policy of the country has to be 
redesigned in its entirety. We believe that the Association Contracts harm national 
sovereignity; there is no technology transfer, no social gain either in coal or oil. We 
believe energy policy can be redesigned to meet social needs, to make a social 
profit”17
 
The “nationalist” argument is part of a broad vision for Colombia that comes not just 
from the left, but from Latin American structuralist-reforming, populist as well as 
Marxist thinking and which has looked to the creation of strong, interventionist states 
to take forward a process of redistributive and nationally oriented development. 
These ideas have been overtaken in most parts of the world by the logic of 
globalization in which generating export earnings through exploiting comparative 
advantages has replaced national industrialisation as an objective of economic policy. 
But a significant sector of the Colombian opposition continues to argue that 
government oil policy has betrayed the national interest. Key areas of critique are in 
the association contracts that oil companies sign with the Colombian government and 
the role of ECOPETROL, the state oil company.  
 
The nationalists argue that the state has always favoured transnational interests over 
those of building an effective national oil industry. Oil reserves, for instance, are 
extracted at the rate that suits the short-term interests of multinational companies not 
according to a national interest aimed at meeting internal needs over the long 
period18. Studies by authors such as Jorge Villegas and more recently Carlos 
Guillermo Alvarez19,  have had an important influence on the arguments of the 
nationalist left, tracing the history of oil companies that once paid royalties of less 
than 10% for Colombia’s oil through concessions granted under questionable 
circumstances. By the 1970s, Colombia was facing a difficult situation of having to 
import oil just when the oil price hikes of 1973 saw the world price rise dramatically. 
It needed to attract foreign investment on new terms, but on terms which would also 
improve the return to the country. In 1974, the government of Lopez Michelson 
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changed the concession approach to oil contracts and in Decree-Law 2310 of 1974, 
gave Ecopetrol the exclusive competence over exploration and exploitation either 
directly or through association contracts with private companies which last 28 years. 
In the latter, the risks are assumed exclusively at first by the private associate and in 
the exploitation phase when there is a commercially exploitable well, Ecopetrol 
provides half the costs in exchange for an equal proportion of production after the 
royalties of 20% have been deducted. Given the high international prices, foreign 
capital returned to Colombia and the discovery of Cano Limón in the early 1980s 
created expectations that oil was to play a considerable part in the country’s economic 
future. 
 
Colombia became an oil exporter once again in 1986 when Caño Limón came on 
stream, boosted in 1992 when the Cusiana field began producing and Caño Limón 
had begun to decline. In 1989, modifications in national oil policy, led to the 
introduction of a scale in the contract, with the aim of enhancing Ecopetrol’s role in 
production in large fields ie as production rose so did the return to Ecopetrol, up to a 
maximum of 70% for the state and 30% for the associate. These modifications 
coincided with the ELN’s pipeline bombing and pressure for the debate on oil policy. 
But while production from the large fields of  Caño Limón and subsequently Cusiana 
Cupiagua generated optimistic ideas of Colombia’s oil potential, the reality was of a 
very poor exploration record and great uncertainty about Colombia’s future as an oil 
supplier. Seismic activity reached a peak of 13,000 Kms in 1985 and fell to 2,300 in 
199620. Only 16 exploration wells were drilled in 1995, compared to 11,008 in 
Canada in the same year21. 
 
The nationalist case argues that Colombian governments have systematically limited 
the capacity of Ecopetrol to develop an autonomous national energy policy, which 
would include serious investment in exploration. This is despite the fact that with 45 
years of experience in oil, Colombia has well trained technicians and technological 
capacity to manage its own reserves22 Ecopetrol is compared unfavourably with other 
state oil companies in Latin America: 
“While other Latin American  oil states have strengthened themselves and 
have privileged roles in the world concert, Ecopetrol has become a mere 
manager of association contracts, with a poor participation in them and with 
no rights to carry out operations. The company produces scarcely 18% of 
Colombian oil…The strategy to increase the exploration of hydrocarbons in 
Colombian territory consists, paradoxically, in preventing Ecopetrol carrying 
out exploration. Even with the bonanza derived from the good prices of crude 
in 1999 and 2000, the state limited itself to obtaining information to be 
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handed over to private companies. It will be the latter and not Ecopetrol that 
drills the wells to discover the national oil. According to the government, 
Colombia cannot afford the luxury of spending 40 million dollars in the 
exploration of a well in order to find out that it is dry. Nevertheless, when the 
Brazilian state company, Petrobrás, the contract operator, discovered the 
Guandó field in el Boquerón, within the jurisdiction of Melgar, of which it is 
said there are 200 million barrels, they had invested less than five million 
dollars in the drilling, which Ecopetrol could have easily done”23
 
From the government of Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) onwards, the state’s main concern has 
been to improve the country’s global competitiveness and attract foreign investment to 
Colombia, and it has modified the association contracts accordingly. The first 
modification was in 1994, when what is known as Factor R (earnings divided by 
expenditure of the Associate) was introduced. Factor R is applied after 60 thousand 
barrels have been produced and after discounting the 20% royalties. It meant that a 
mathematical formula for the division of the production sets in once the accumulated 
costs of investment, exploration and operation are taken into account, in other words 
taking account of the economy of the project and not the accumulated production.  This 
formula was made more favorable to the Associate in October 1997 under President 
Samper. This created more distinctions between the risks involved, whether the fields are 
small, the pace of production, quality of the hydrocarbons etc.24 The former Minister of 
Mines and Energy, Margarita Mena de Quevado, asked the question in her contribution to 
the Symposium on Oil and Peace in 1999, “How much corresponds to the Colombian 
state and how much to the associate company in terms of the benefits of oil, of each barrel 
of oil?” Before the Factor R adjustment of 1997, she calculated that the State’s share 
oscillated between 80 and 85% of production. Following the adjustment, her conclusion is 
that “the improvement for the companies must be significant, since with the changes, 
Ecopetrol aims to stimulate investment. The State has ceded in favour of the 
multinationals, a sad thing, which is explained by the lack of confidence in the country 
and the excessive violence which surrounds the activities of the oil industry. A very high 
economic price that we are paying in order to explore in the present conditions.25 In 1999, 
the Government of Andres Pastrana introduced the New Factor R, which in effect 
guaranteed the associate partner an improved return, through a new sliding royalty scale, 
in which 20% would only be an upper limit and 5% the lower limit depending on the 
production field size. 
 
The former Minister went on to argue that the weakness and weakening of Ecopetrol’s 
financial base would eventually reduce the state company to “an oil contract management 
office”. She called for a new consensus aimed at strengthening the company based on the 
principles of “competitivity and defence of national interests”26 .The Colombian 
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Petroleum Produces Association argues, however, that Colombia has no choice but to 
improve the terms for foreign investors. Colombian oil represents a geological risk, of 
every five wells that are dug, four are dry27. The insecurity surrounding the wells, the 
delays in giving permits and environmental licences, lack of clarity around consultations 
with minority ethnic groups, are all factors, it argues, that reduce the country’s 
competitivity and need to be addressed28. 
 
Other arguments that have persistently questioned the role of the transnational oil 
companies, are those of environmental groups and indigenous groups who have been 
impacted by oil exploration. There are many important issues raised by both.,but they will 
not due to space be the main focus here.29It is important to mention that despite the armed 
conflict and the dangers of social activism in Colombia, environmental groups have been 
very active in monitoring oil companies, including in Casanare. This is partly due to the 
legislative legitimacy and protection granted these efforts by the 1991 Constitution and 
the establishment of  regional  environmental watchdog bodies.30 The most famous of the 
stories around indigenous land rights and oil in Colombia, is that of the Uw’a who 
successfully resisted the efforts by Occidental to explore oil in their sacred lands in 
Samoré, Arauca31.  
 
The methods used by the ELN to pursue its attacks on the oil industry and which it has 
tried to legitimize through its nationalist discourse on oil, should not direct attention away 
from the existence of a serious debate around national energy policy, environmental 
issues and indigenous rights. Indeed it is this which enabled the ELN to win tacit 
sympathy for its strategy of oil pipeline destruction from those who would not otherwise 
support armed struggle. This sympathy has been gradually dissipating with the 
environmental damage they have caused and with the appalling loss of life in Machuca, 
when in 1998, 70 villagers lost their life after the ELN attacked the oil pipeline. Efforts to 
promote dialogue on the role of oil between a range of actors, suggest that it is still 
important to distinguish the substantive issues around national oil policy, from oil as a 
funding mechanism for war and violence. As the latter has escalated however, the 
argument in favour of offering more favourable terms to foreign companies has gathered 
in strength. On the other hand, it could be argued that if the Colombian state had had a 
serious policy towards the development of its oil sector in the past, it might not have 
faced the urgency to encourage foreign investment in exploration in the 1990s, when 
conditions were so adverse. 
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The debate on oil ultimately reflects long-standing and highly contentious themes in 
economic development, particularly the tension between ownership and control of 
national mineral resources and dependence on transnational companies to take the 
exploration risk, thus justifying their gains from subsequent exploitation. While it appears 
to be the story line of “old wars”, the argument that Colombia should have a strong 
national and state directed energy policy has certainly not disappeared in Colombia. And 
while there is an ideological dimension to the discussion32, there are also a serious set of 
real issues which relate to the prospects for peace in Colombia. At the core of these is the 
broad question of what kind of state will emerge from this period of intense war in the 
country and whose interests will it promote? The ability of the Colombian state to stand 
back and above the particular interests that lay claim to it is an historic deficit. This has 
prevented it developing legitimacy in the eyes of the society as a whole, particularly 
amongst those living in marginal rural regions or marginal neighbourhoods of large cities. 
In both situations, power and wealth have been won through the ability of brokers to 
mediate between a local clientele and state patronage and/or through the gun. Oil is only 
one theme in the debate about what kind of state would best meet the needs of Colombian 
citizens. But it is one whose high profile made it an attractive target for creating a 
legitimising discourse by left armed groups. Its legitimising force derived from the real 
ongoing debate about Colombian state and nation building. 
 
OIL AND THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY IN TIMES OF WAR 
 
How important is oil to the Colombian economy? This question became important in the 
course of the 1990s and into the 2000s as the armed conflict intensified while the 
economy entered recession. 
 
Colombia is not a major player in the international oil market nor is it a petro-state. Its 
world share of proven reserves at the end of 2001 was a mere 0.2% and these are due to 
run out in just under eight years at present rates of production33. Its production rose from 
430 thousand barrels a day in 1991 to a peak of 838 a day in 1999, declining to 627 in 
200134 when it contributed 0.9% to world production35. At current rates, Colombia will be 
a net importer of crude between 2008 and 2010. While it is a marginal oil producer 
internationally with serious danger of disappearing from the tables altogether if the 
country’s potential reserves are not further explored and exploited in the near future, the 
oil sector has played a very significant role in the country’s economy, particularly over 
the last ten years. It made a contribution of 3% to GDP in 1999 and provided in that year 
32 % of exports; coffee, the traditionally leading export, provided only 9%. While oil 
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became a vital area of the Colombian economy in the 1990s, Colombia is not an oil 
economy as such 36. The rising importance of oil was due to the discovery of two large 
fields: Caño Limón in Arauca which began producing in 1986 and the Cusiana and 
Cupiagua fields in Casanare, which began producing in 1992 and 1995 respectively and 
represented 50% of Colombia’s total oil production in 199937. Cusiana and Cupiagua are 
operated by BP on behalf of a group of companies38, and are one of the most important oil 
finds in Latin America in recent times, although they are now on the decline39. Caño 
Limón is also near depletion. Colombia urgently seeks to expand exploration and 
exploitation of other reserves. Its challenge is attracting foreign investment when many 
reserves are in the midst of war zones and when the oil sector is a target for extortion, 
kidnapping and installation damage.40
 
Oil revenues made a major contribution to public finances in the 1990s, compensating for 
the decline in international coffee prices and reducing the public sector deficit. In 1999 
alone they generated a US$2 billion net income for the country, around 25% of 
government revenues41. Revenues such as these also represent a great opportunity for 
economic modernization and development in Colombia, and like other better endowed oil 
producing states, the debate on the relationship between oil wealth and development is a 
very live one42. This debate is particularly heightened in Colombia at the time of writing, 
given the economic recession of the late 1990s and the intensification of the armed 
conflict in the course of the decade and beginning of the 21st century. Rather than a 
contribution to development, however, oil has been mostly seen hitherto as crucial to 
macro-economic stability43.  
 
Economic stability and growth are critical to the success of President Alvaro Uribe’s 
(elected in August 2002) political project of enhancing state authority over the country 
and the armed groups. Economic prospects will impact on political support for the 
government project as well as state resources and capacity to deliver. The continued 
generation of oil revenues and how they are used are therefore extremely important to the 
war/peace effort of the Colombian state. Foreign investors have to be persuaded to 
develop potential oil reserves and guarantee future production and oil revenues in the face 
of armed conflict, a serious challenge for oil policy makers. Some feel that they have 
received little help from the Colombian government so far. Despite the importance of the 
sector to its economic survival, the government has taken relatively little interest in the 
security of oil production, leaving it mostly to the armed forces funded in the 1990s by a 
“war tax” on oil companies44. Oil producers with the support of their Association have 
been left to find their own strategies towards the conflict around them, which have come 
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to rely much more on good relationships with the local community than on armed 
defence. In this sense, the decision by the US government to train a counter-terror unit to 
defend the Coveñas oil pipeline, represents a significant shift in approaches to oil industry 
security in Colombia. US involvement will strengthen the case of those who argue that 
US strategic oil interests are playing an increasingly central role in the Colombian 
conflict. 45  
 
OIL AND THE WAGING OF WAR: THE ECONOMISATION ARGUMENT 
 
Many question whether the debate around national oil policy discussed above, is still a 
serious motivating force behind the ELN and FARC activities in Colombia, or that 
motivation rather than opportunity causes armed conflict in any case. There is little 
evidence of political rather than military considerations in the FARC's increased attacks 
on the oil industry in the late 1990s. In addition, paramilitary right groups with little 
interest in the nationalist debate have also emerged and by the late 1990s were also 
funding their armed activities indirectly and sometimes directly from the oil industry. In 
this sense, it appears that the oil industry has become just one more source of war 
funding. The new resources driven logic appears to have set in and be transforming the 
conflict. It becomes harder to argue that substantive topics for debate persist in the midst 
of the violence, or that there might be unresolved state and nation building tasks that are 
equally significant explanations for why war is prolonged in Colombia. Table 1 
summarises the forms in which oil directly and indirectly funds war in Colombia. 
 
Would the war have evolved differently in Colombia without oil? A lootable resource 
such as drugs, which can also benefit poor communities, has arguably played a more 
critical role46. The table nevertheless illustrates that left-wing armed groups have 
benefited considerably from oil, and one in particular, the ELN, was virtually rebuilt after 
a massive defeat through its relationship with Mannesmann and Occidental in Arauca. 
Since then, it has used kidnapping and extortion of oil companies to sustain and expand 
its activities. The Coveñas pipeline had been bombed 460 times by 1996, an escalation 
due to Occidental's decision to halt the war tax payment first granted by Mannesmann, 
and 24 oil workers were kidnapped that year.47 Between 1986 and 2001 the pipeline has 
been attacked a total of 911 times (see table) at a cost of US$141.2 million 48.At the same 
time the ELN has used these actions to justify and to publicise its political goals. Oil has 
been an instrument for a wider political project for the ELN, while the FARC have taken 
a far more military approach to the oil industry reflecting their greater commitment to 
winning territorial control over the focista guerrilla tactics favoured  by the ELN. Oil 
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revenues from the municipalities it came to control has enabled the FARC to compete 
with the ELN in Arauca and ultimately wrest influence from it. This impacted on the 
attitude towards the pipeline bombing which has been criticised in the past by the FARC.  
The ELN blew up the pipeline enough to guarantee the continued flow of royalties and to 
publicise their legitimising discourse around oil. They did not aim to stop the flow of oil. 
But this is what happened in 2001 after the FARC became the dominant force in Arauca. 
The Caño Limón pipeline was bombed a record 170 times in 2001, about 14 times a 
month, although it fell in the first four months of 2002 to five times a month49.  
 
Oil is a politically strategic commodity for the ELN, but one more military target and 
source of funding for the FARC. The military and political weakening of the ELN, and 
the discrediting of ELN's tactics following the Machuca massacre have played a role in 
the dynamics around oil and conflict, and at the same time, the FARC's fortunes have 
strengthened. In Casanare, the FARC offensive in the region aimed to give it an important 
corridor between its areas of control in the South West and Arauca and the Venezuelan 
frontier, and its attacks in the Department escalated at the end of the 1990s and early 
2000s. Elsewhere in Colombia, the exploration of new fields has become the target of 
more frequent attempts at extortion and attacks. As the war has escalated, these attacks 
have become more frontal. Hocol for instance, mining in FARC territory in Huila, only 
experienced one attack in 1992, and then two in 1999 and 2001, of which the latter was 
very sophisticated, involving 100 armed men who knew where to cause most damage, 
setting fire to the most productive wells50. At the same time, through the FARC’s Law 
002 it announced that every business worth over one million dollars would be subject to a 
“war tax.” 
 
The paramilitary have been able to indirectly benefit from oil through taxing local 
contractors and extortion from local businesses, as well as accessing revenues from 
municipalities. This increased considerably in the course of the 1990s as the war 
intensified and more funds were needed to wage it51. These “taxes” by armed groups are 
known in Colombia as the vacuna or the vaccination, as they are supposed to guarantee 
some form of protection. In Casanare, the paramilitary have manipulated the tensions 
between communites  and incomers from outside Casanare, over the lack of jobs in the oil 
industry, particularly as it enters the least labour intensive phase, in order to build social 
and political ties. There are two NGOs in the region reputed to have been set up by the 
paramilitary to channel funds for social purposes52.  
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The armed forces of the state have expanded their operations in oil producing zones 
because of the war tax from oil companies. This has not protected the civilians population 
of Casanare. Evidence that the army colludes directly or indirectly with paramilitary 
groups in human rights violations has undermined faith in the state to offer security53. 
While pressure from the international human rights movement seems to have resulted in a 
shift in any institutional policy of collaboration with the paramilitary, the common 
purpose of defeating the guerrillas still creates de facto bonds and often practical 
collusion. In Casanare, it is the police, underfunded and understaffed who combat the 
paramilitary if anyone does, not the army and they pay the cost in terms of reprisals.54. 
The police post often manned by a handful of men is usually also the first target for 
guerilla attacks. 
 
Criminally motivated actors exploit opportunities in the interstices of the political 
violence, creating confusion and greater fear amongst civilians while contributing to the 
overall climate of disorder and breakdown of social norms.  The stealing of oil from the 
pipelines to resell is a growing enterprise in Colombia. It is not, of course, easy to prove 
that this is criminally motivated rather than linked with the war. 
 
Nor should the focus on the armed groups in the conflict detract attention from the way 
some civilians, including civilian elites, gain electorally and materially from alliances 
with armed groups. Those civilians who might have backed a more serious developmental 
project are often killed, exiled or terrorised. Election to office often comes with the price 
of an alliance with one or other armed group, a price accepted by some in search of 
maintaining the traditional institutional and civilian space but who find subsequently that 
the space has diminished and their freedom of manoeuvre gone. Gradually, the incentives 
for accepting the new authority of armed power increase over commitment to civilian 
authority, and a situation emerges which is very difficult to reverse. 
 
Oil has transformed conflict dynamics in the producing zones of Colombia in qualitative 
ways. It has intensified and probably prolonged it, through the resources it provides for 
armed groups to recruit, purchase weapons and food and carry out military actions. But it 
is not inevitable that it should have done this. Unravelling the contingent contextual 
factors it is argued, is as important to understanding the relationship between oil and war 
as the way oil transforms, intensifies and prolongs conflict, because this enables us to 
identify any action or policies that might have intervened to prevent the escalation. In 
complex contemporary conflicts where there are multiple poles of attraction between 
armed men, understanding the detail can be critical to understanding the whole. 
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TABLE 1: OIL AND WAR: SUMMARY OF ACTIONS AND EFFECTS   
Armed Group Oil-related action Effect on Armed Conflict 
ELN • Blowing up oil pipeline 
• Kidnapping oil workers  
• “Taxing” oil contract workers and 
local people 
• Siphoning oil revenues from 
municipalities through ELN backed  
elected representatives 
• Attacks on oil installations eg wells, 
exploration sites, oil company 
helicopters 
 
• Ransom and extortion money from 
Occidental has financed ELN 
expansion and ongoing operational 
costs 
• Extortion from companies repairing 
the oil pipeline. 
• Social Fund that ELN forced from 
Occidental enhanced social base of 
ELN in Arauca 
• Targeting oil industry enabled the 
ELN to construct a legitimising 
discourse for armed struggle. 
Pipeline bombed in name of 
extracting money for local 
community. 
• Economic weakening of government 
(cost of pipeline damage estimated at 
US$141 million between 1986 and 
2001 
• Publicity for cause 
• Funding operational costs 
 
FARC 
• Syphoning of oil revenues from 
municipal authorities, Extortion of 
local businesses 
• Attacks on oil installations 
particularly since late 1990s, on 
wells, throwing bombs over the 
perimeter fence, shooting at 
helicopters, and larger scale military 
attacks 
• Late 1990s, involved in oil pipeline 
bombing. 
• Political/ military control over 
municipalities and  access to 
revenues 
• Social influence and political 
representation to guarantee territorial 
control (Arauca) 
• Financing operations 
• High profile targets for military 
advantage 
 
PARAMILITA
RY 
 
 
• Abducting and murder of oil union 
members (an estimated 165 were 
killed in Colombia in 2001) 
• Massacres and selective murders of 
social activists and suspected 
guerrilla sympathisers in oil 
producing regions 
• Extortion from businesses, contract 
workers and municipal authorities 
increasing since late 1990s. 
• Exploiting tensions within 
communities over local access to 
jobs in oil industry 
 
• Extra-judicial executions of social 
activists controls and terrorises 
population. Further erodes climate 
faith in rule of law 
• Direct and indirect assistance from 
armed forces of state erodes 
legitimacy of state security apparatus 
• Financing operations, paying recruits 
• Enhancing control over population 
and territory as war aims 
CRIMINAL 
NETWORKS 
• Extortion from contract workers and 
local businesses  
• Fluidity between criminal and 
political violence contributes to 
overall sense of disorder 
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• Stealing oil from perforations in 
pipelines to sell as cheap fuel. 
• Opportunistic violence and 
accumulation in midst of war, further 
degrades norms of society 
ARMED 
FORCES 
• War tax paid by multinational 
companies in 1990s 
• Collusion / “blind eye” approach to  
paramilitary 
• Human rights violations 
• Protects oil installations 
• Army accused of protecting oil not 
people 
• Loss of legitimacy of state 
 
 
OIL AND THE WAGING OF WAR: THE CONTINGENT CONTEXTUAL 
FACTORS 
 
The case of Arauca in the 1980s was a warning of the potential impact oil might have in 
Casanare in the 1990s.The Arauca case illustrates the importance of two qualities of oil 
that are particularly relevant to its potentially negative role in local and national conflict 
situations. The first is that given its international significance as an energy source to 
modern society, it generates a large amount of revenue. The second is that it is a resource 
that has a fixed relationship with territory, requiring specialised infrastructure to be 
removed from that territory, the “obstructability” dimension referred to by Michael 
Ross55.  
 
In the Arauca case these two elements were extremely important in the context of the 
country’s first large scale oil find in Caño Limón in 1983, ie a sudden influx of a large 
amount of funds to an impoverished territory and a commodity requiring a long pipe-line 
to transport it to the market56. These interacted with the agendas of relatively weak leftist 
guerrilla movements at the time and a pattern of political practices and competition for 
power amongst local elites. The size of the Caño Limón field, like that of Cusiana-
Cupiagua in Casanare in the 1990s, generated huge expectations as well as real wealth. 
The role of oil in the Colombian war cannot be fully understood without analysing the 
particular way the dynamics of large oil discoveries and local political cultures 
intersected. This section will use two case studies, one based on Andres Peñate’s field 
study of Arauca in the late 1980s, and the other on my own field visits to Casanare in 
1997, 2001 and 2002 to explore these dynamics57
 
The Case of Arauca in the 1980s 
 
Colombian legislation gives the province and the municipality where the oil well is 
located a 9.5% and 2.5% respectively share of the royalties58.  Arauca is a huge territory 
with a very small population of around 100,000 people when oil was discovered in 
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1983.59 When Caño Limón came on stream in 1986, it generated a bonanza for a very 
poor and very sparsely populated region, calculated at 195 million dollars over five years 
for the regional government or Intendencia at 1980s60 prices, as well as royalties for the 
municipalities where the oil is located. This large amount of resources became available 
to a territory where politics was still a struggle for personal accumulation of wealth and 
power based on relationships with vote-delivering clients.  
 
Arauca, is located like Casanare, in what were known as the National Terrorities, those 
regions of Colombia on the Eastern frontier with Venezuela. While historians argue over 
the relative importance these regions have played in the national “story”61, there is 
agreement that the central part of that narrative has been the densely populated Andean 
highlands and not in these regions which between them held only half a million of 
Colombia’s population in 1985. These frontier zones have been historically and 
economically backward and until the 1980s of relatively minor interest to the central 
State. A common thread in these regions is the pattern of colonization, particular in the 
1950s to 1980s. In Arauca, this expanded in the 1970s when the region became part of a 
more concerted effort by the State to facilitate settlement, through the Colombian Institute 
of Agrarian Reform ( INCORA). This led to an influx of an estimated 8,000 families 
(60,000 people) between 1970-197662 to the Sarare, Andean foothills or piedemonte 
region, altering the traditional balance of local power politics and the competition 
amongst traditional political leaders of the lower plains region for power and patronage at 
the national level. Electoral competition shifted in favour of winning the vote of the new 
towns and population centres of the foothills63. The two Senate and one House of 
Representative seats which Arauca was critical in electing64 were invaluable for the 
patronage they gave ie key appointments to local state bodies and access to their 
resources. They were traditionally controlled by the large landowners of the Plains or 
Llanos65. Control over the expenditure of INCORA and other government bodies was 
essential to win electoral support, particularly amongst the poor and struggling settlers of 
Sarare. The efforts of these increasingly militant and organised colonizers to keep the 
resources and support from INCORA flowing is one of the key dynamics of the region. In 
the absence of a state to mediate between their needs and the interests of the dominant, 
traditional elite of the plains area with strong ties into the national party structures, the 
settlers organised direct action, such as civic strikes. Into the power and patronage 
competition amongst Arauca’s traditional political elites of the lower plains and the 
struggles of peasant colonisers to build their livelihoods with any support they could 
muster66, came two new forces: the FARC and the ELN guerrilla movements.  
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The ELN, much depleted after major defeats in the 1970s, shifted its remaining 36 
combatants from Santander into the Sarare jungle of Arauca in 197967 and established the 
Domingo Lain front.  It was still influenced by the focista68 theory of revolution. In the 
meantime, the FARC guerrillas had decided to expand their operations to the new areas of 
colonization and in 1982 set up their tenth front in Sarare, the “Guadelupe Salcedo”. 
Shortly afterwards, in 1984, the FARC entered into a peace agreement with Belisario 
Betancur and out of this emerged a new political party, the Patriotic Union (UP). The UP 
was to be a broad left alliance capable of challenging the traditional domination of 
Colombian politics by the Liberal and Conservative parties. In the Sarare foothill region 
of Arauca, a very particular scenario was being played out which reflected the local rather 
than national project of the UP and in which the FARC strategic objectives towards the 
region aimed at expanding its territorial influence, played a major role. At the same time, 
the ELN began to compete with the FARC for a social base in the settler towns of the 
Sarare, facilitated by the social programmes that it had won from Mannesmann as ransom 
for the release of its employees and for being allowed to complete the pipeline on time.   
 
Between them, the two guerrilla forces began to manipulate the political rivalries of the 
region between the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties (the latter by far the most 
dominate in Arauca as in the rest of the Plains or Llanos region) and between factions of 
the Liberal Party. Equally, rising political elites turned to the armed groups in their battles 
against traditional elites and amongst themselves. Armed power supplemented the 
clientelist relationships of traditional politics, and a rising number of politically motivated 
killings was the outcome69. This coincided with the arrival in 1986 amidst widespread 
expectation, of oil royalties to the region following the completion of the pipeline in 
January of that year. Political control of the key bodies that distributed revenues became a 
very high prize, and the elections of 1986 and 1988 when the direct election of mayors 
took place for the first time, were key moments.  
 
One of the contingent contextual factors here was the relationship of the National 
Territories to the state, both formally through the constitution and institutional structures, 
as well as informally through the party clientelism that link local and national politics in 
Colombia irrespective of the weakness of the state in particular regions. The National 
Territories at this time were quite centrally controlled by the government through the 
Intendente (a presidential appointee) or governor of the Territory and DAINCO 
(Departamento Administrativo de Intendencias y Comisarías), the official government 
body which gave final approval to the budgets of the Territories. This system was open to 
considerable abuse from political manipulation, particularly if the same party or faction 
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controlled the Intendencia and DAINCO. On the other hand, despite their lack of 
appropriately trained officials and administrative capacity, the municipalities were given 
fiscal autonomy. This raised the stakes in the battle for control of the small municipalities 
of Arauca, particularly in the Sarare region of highest population growth, .  
 
Oil revenues in Arauca came on stream when existing budgetary mechanisms were 
inadequate and open to political manipulation and corruption, and where no planning had 
been invested in preparing for the large influx of funds. ‘The royalities’ argues Peñate, 
‘which resulted from the discovery of Caño Limón began to alter the political life of 
Arauca even before Ecopetrol had sent the first cheque to the provincial treasury’70   He 
shows that in the fiscal year before revenues came on stream, the budget of the region 
was just 715 million pesos, its government was only able to spend 500 million that year71. 
By April 1987, a year and a half after the completion of the pipeline, the regional 
administration had a surplus of over 1,000 million pesos. The demands from the 
organised communities of Sarare far exceeded what even this could deliver, but the lack 
of mechanisms to ensure a fair distribution of the revenues in the interests of the 
“common good” encouraged every interest group and sector to fight for its share of the 
pie.  
 
The Sarare settler communities began to challenge the traditional elites of the plains, who 
still maintained political control of the regional bodies responsible for distributing 
resources. Peñate’s calculations show that through political manoeuvres, the towns of the 
plains received half of Caño Limón’s municipal and regional royalties although only one 
third of Arauca’s population live there72 . In the meantime, the organised communities of 
the Sarare, launched a series of civil strike and popular protests demanding more 
resources. When the provincial government agreed to more public investment, protest 
action grew as each town and village where the investment was intended demanded 
control over who built the project. At the same time, contracted companies often had to 
pay money to the guerrillas if they wanted to complete the works. 
 
Oil royalties intervened in this political battle between the settlers and the Plains elite, but 
in turn, there was the further schism caused by competition between independent 
members of the traditional Liberal Party and the UP, backed respectively by the ELN and 
the FARC, for control of the municipalities of the Sarare region. While both groups were 
allied against the Plains elite, they were at loggerheads for political control of the 
Sarare.The Intendente of Arauca gave an interview to Peñate in 1990 which should have 
been a clear warning for Casanare: 
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‘in the Intendencia you don’t do things but things are done to you. Pressures and 
gossip everywhere. Watch out for so and so, he’s a friend of the guerrillas, so and so 
steals resources…Everyone asks for something, everyone wants everything now. 
They give you advise without being asked, and you don’t know who to believe nor 
who to trust’ 
 
Peñate concludes that the basic pattern of political life as a transaction around a vote in 
exchange for a material benefit, was not altered by oil royalties in an “unpredictable or 
radical manner”73. In other words, it would have been possible to foresee how a massive 
influx of resources might have interacted with the clientelist culture of politics. In the 
absence of appropriate intervention, oil royalties and extortion of the oil industry, began 
to transform the conflict in Arauca, militarising the political conflicts and power 
struggles. Oil failed to bring serious benefits to the people of Arauca74 There are at least 
four key actions that might have avoided the process through which social co-existence in 
the region became mediated by armed actors indirectly funded by the oil industry: 
 
1. Adequate state protection of the new pipeline and oil installations to avoid the 
Occidental/Mannesmann deal with the ELN carried out by security forces trained to 
respect human rights. 
2. State action to build effective political institutions, promote political and social 
adjustments to demographic change and land pressures, protect the space for citizen 
action against corruption and challenge the clientelist political practices which 
preserved the dominance of traditional parties and political/landowning elites. 
3. Promotion of effective judicial institutions capable of implementing the rule of law 
and protecting citizens threatened by armed groups. 
4. An action plan for the proper use of royalties within the context of the developmental 
needs of the region and implemented by legitimate political authority capable of 
rising above particularist interests and basing itself on what could be recognised as a 
commitment to a “common good”. 
 
The case of Casanare in the 1990s. 
 
British Petroleum began exploration in Casanare in 1987 and the Cusiana75 and 
Cupiagua fields in the municipalities of Tauramena and Aguazul were discovered in 
the following two years76. The two municipalities are within 7 kilometers from the 
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processing facilities. Commercial production of oil from Cusiana began in September 
1992.  BP had very little experience of drilling in populated regions with a weak state 
presence and a history of violence and conflict. During the years 1990-1998, the 
company made a number of critical mistakes in their approach to the region. The 
company has embarked on a very distinct strategy since then, but it is very difficult 
for a high profile multinational to recover its reputation after mistakes, while the 
conflict in the region has been transformed in favour of armed power of all kinds. The 
oil company extracted only the surface story of the Arauca experience rather than the 
complex underlying sub-plots. However, even if it had fully appreciated these, it 
would not have helped the company to simply read off the situation in Arauca and 
“apply the lessons” to Casanare. In addition, the Arauca situation had already reached 
a certain point by 1990. The presence of the oil industry had transformed the 
character of the conflict in the region, a corrupting process from which few could 
remain immune, and many who tried, lost their lives77. The situation in Arauca would 
inevitably have consequences for Casanare, but Casanare had many of its own 
particularities, and knowing these well was probably the only way to manage the 
impact of oil.  
 
There are two parts to the Casanare case study that follows. The first will trace the 
rise of what is called a process of multipolar militarization in Casanare and its 
relationship to territorial claims, rent seeking and wealth accumulation. The second 
explores how this militarization interacted with civil life and institutions, particularly 
after the arrival of oil. By 1998 the interaction between the two had resulted in a 
situation reached by Arauca in 1988, ie armed domination of civilian political and 
social life, although in Casanare this took forms of its own. 
 
Territory, Rents and Accumulation: Economic factors in the Multipolar 
Militarization of Casanare 
 
BP drew the lesson from Arauca in the early 1990s, that it should not make any deals 
with the guerrillas. It turned to the Colombian armed forces with a long history of 
human rights violations for protection78. But an important additional lesson from 
Arauca which was not embraced, was the way oil interacted with the pre-existing 
patterns of political and social life. In Arauca, guerillas had manipulated these 
patterns and forged implicit and sometimes explicit alliances with competing political 
elites in order to gain de facto control over oil revenues. The particularities of these 
pre-existing patterns would be different in Casanare, but the particularities needed to 
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be taken into account in terms of the way the discovery of a huge oil field would 
impact on them.  
 
The war in Colombia evolved in new ways in the 1990s. On the one hand the ELN 
and the FARC enjoyed a new lease of life, the ELN through its strategic focus on oil 
and the FARC through its involvement in drugs. The rent seeking element was vital 
for both, and by the end of the 1990s would become more critical than its strategic 
worth for an ELN struggling to survive militarily. The FARC saw rent seeking as a 
means to further its territorial claims and respond to the paramilitary expansion in the 
1990s. The paramilitary had their origins in private armies which were formed in the 
1980s to enable elites to defend themselves from guerrillas in the face of what was 
seen as the failure of the armed forces79. These became known as self-defence groups.  
In Arauca, the first such group appeared in Saravena in 1993, a vigilante group 
known as the Saravena Self-Defence or Los Encapuchados (The Hooded Ones). It 
targeted unionised workers, particularly members of the peasant organisation, ANUC 
and political opposition leaders80. A number of local and regional self-defense groups 
emerged at this time in different conflict zones, including Casanare. They were 
facilitated by the legislation in 1994 to authorise the Convivir, civilian armed groups 
that were supposed to support the army in preventive, defensive and intelligence 
work. The abuses committed by these groups led to the revocation of this legislations, 
but by then self-defence or paramilitary groups had multiplied. In most cases, the 
armed forces colluded if they did not actively encourage these groups81. 
 
At this time, BP like the Colombian state, saw the threat to oil extraction in Casanare 
as coming exclusively from the guerrillas whose presence was not as strong as in 
Arauca but which was clearly growing. The position was understandable given the 
experience of Arauca, the fact that the ELN had publicly declared that the oil industry 
was a military target, and that the guerrillas were clearly enemies of the Colombian 
state. But it misjudged the complexity of politics in Casanare, and that the ELN 
would be only one of a number of armed actors with interests in the region and only 
one of the problems the oil industry would face. While the paramilitary right did not 
formally target the oil industry, its abuse of the civilian population and criminal 
extortion of local BP contractors had serious implications for BP and the 
militarization of Casanare. In the course of the 1990s, oil interacted with a variety of 
agendas of at least four organised armed groups seeking territory, rents and 
accumulation for a number of distinct purposes. 
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Casanare, like Arauca with which it shares a border, is part of the Orinoquia region. It 
is a frontier zone and province of Boyacá until it became an administrative district or 
Intendencia like Arauca in 1973, and a Department in 1991. The Department is a 
disarticulated territory, whose central economic axis and identity had not been formed 
before the arrival of oil. The region is normally divided, rather like Arauca, into a 
Plains area, the llanos proper, and the foothills or Piedemonte region, itself divided 
between the Andean slopes or cordillera above 1,000 meters and the foothills 
themselves. Like Arauca, the foothills are the most densely populated area. Eleven of 
Casanare’s nineteen municipalities are located there.82. In the Llanos, extensive cattle 
ranching predominates, in the piedemonte small peasant farming. The Cusiana-
Cupiagua field is located right in the midst of this piedemonte. In the South around 
Villanueva, there is an important agro-industrial area based on african palm and rice 
production as well as a traditional ranching  and an illegal drugs processing economy, 
 
In Casanare each of these socio-economic spaces has a story to tell with respect to the 
war, independent of as well as interacting with the arrival of oil. Another “reading” of 
Casanare is an ongoing process to determine the “Casanare identity” which would 
shape the future of the Department. This had never emerged clearly from the natural 
topography, dispersed settlement patterns or from a commodity capable of generating 
wealth through commercialisation to outside markets. Cattle ranching in Casanare has 
never been a highly productive and lucrative sector, partly because of the poor 
communications and difficulties of transporting cattle to national markets and general 
lack of investment. The one road since the 1930s between Aguazul, Yopal and 
Sogamoso (Boyaca) was only passable in the summer. Ranchers from the South 
sought alternatives; the road to Villavicencio via Barranca de Upía once the bridge 
over the river Upia was built, linked them to the Meta and ultimately a route to 
Bogota83. In the late 1970s, african palm gave a new economic impetus to Villanueva 
and set it further apart from other areas of Casanare. Just over a decade later, oil 
shifted the centre of gravity towards the central region and Yopal. Oil was not a 
commodity owned by local interests, but a source of rents, around which the political 
elite could develop a Casanare project “a la Yopaleño”84. But this has not gone 
unchallenged. The South maintains its own project, which is being built through 
various forms of illegal accumulation and a paramilitary army that has sought to build 
its social base amongst the population of the area. The growth and consolidation of 
Yopal with the rise of oil has meant, however, that it cannot be ignored, and at least 
part of the logic of the paramilitary expansion of the 1990s is about control over the 
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Department's future not just about the defeat of the guerillas. The following sections 
looks at the rise of each of the armed groups of Casanare. 
 
The cattle ranching families of the llanos dominate the landowning structure of 
Casanare which consists primarily of large and very large properties:492 properties  
or 1.8% of all properties, own 48% of the total land of the area in farms over 1,000 
hectares. In contrast, 90% of properties own only 22% of the land area; 28% of 
properties own less than ten hectares.85  These families, which one historian calls 
“dynasties”86 form a llanera culture characterised by a long history of violent 
expulsion and subjugation of the Indians who originally inhabited the region and 
which continued into the twentieth century. 87. Some Indians may have survived by 
accepting acculturalization and joined the growing mixed or mestizo population of 
daily paid workers on the estates, or landless poor. These were the foot soldiers, 
argues Pérez Ángel,  of the violent conflicts of the Llanos, of which the civil war or 
Violencia of the 1950s was the most bloody88. During and after the Violencia, a wave 
of colonisation of small farmers from Boyaca came to Casanare in search of land and 
peace. They found neither. Most of the colonization to Casanare was spontaneous, 
and unlike Arauca, there was no systematic INCORA programme of support and land 
titling. The peasants arrived in a region where state presence and infrastructure were 
minimal, settling in the higher Andean slopes and the foothills, wherever they could 
find a piece of land.  
 
The FARC guerrillas began visiting communities in the Piedemonte of Casanare in 
the mid 1980s and the ELN established its armed presence in the municipalities of the 
cordillera, such as La Salina, Recetor and Chámeza89 a few years later. The guerrillas 
came to control some of these population centres and the people learnt to regard them 
as the authority in the town. Today, displaced people from these municipalities are 
murdered simply for their place of origin in their identity card 90.These locations were 
chosen partly because of their isolation and their importance as a logistical rearguard, 
partly because of the focista vision of acting as a catalyst to mobilise the poorest 
peasants against their servitude and partly because of the ELN's strategic interest in 
the oil industry91. From its strongholds in communities it controlled, the ELN began 
its attacks on BP's exploration and production facilities in the region in the early 
1990s. The ELN’s Jose David Suárez and Jose Domingo Laín Saénz Fronts also 
infiltrated the social and political life of many other municipalities of the Piedemonte, 
turning them into spaces that would be contested by all the armed groups of the 
Department. 
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The idea of "Araucanizing" Casanare may have been a tactical vision of the ELN, but 
it would prove more complicated in Casanare, a Department twice the size of Arauca 
with a distinct history and socio/political composition and relatively more diversified 
economy. Although oil came to dominate the Casanare economy, the Department 
never became an oil enclave like its neighbour92. The ELN was unable to build a 
tactical alliance with independent politicians within the dominant Liberal Party, 
although like all the armed groups it has infiltrated the electoral processes in order to 
access municipal and regional revenues through successful candidates. Even its 
military actions against the oil installations were containable by mid-1997-98.93 The 
mass civic actions of Arauca could not be replicated amongst the less organised 
peasants of Casanare, although the ELN probably tried to intervene in some of the 
land struggles and community struggles against BP that took place in the early 
1990s94. As the ELN grew militarily weaker in the late 1990s, it directed its attentions 
to its need for funds, primarily kidnapping and extortion of oil contractors, and taxing 
local businesses and individuals. 
 
The FARC established three of its 33 Fronts in Casanare in the mid 1990s, the 28 and 
45 Fronts in the north and the 38 in the south. This was less out of interest in the oil 
industry than for the drug trading corridors that linked the producing areas it 
controlled in the Meta to markets. It was forced out, however, of Monterrey, 
Villanueva and Sabanalarga.But its interest in the strategic territorial importance of 
Casanare which connects strong areas of FARC influence in the Meta and Arauca, 
increased. There is a rumour that the FARC commander Mono Joyo ordered his 
troops to rescue Casanare in the late 1990s after it had virtually fallen under 
paramilitary control. The FARC escalated its military presence and actions, 
displacing the ELN from some areas of the Piedemonte, challenging paramilitary 
control and organising regular Paros Armados (lit.armed strikes) when no traffic on 
the vulnerable main communications thoroughfare through Yopal was permitted. It 
also blew up the electricity pylons and twice left Yopal without electricity for long 
periods in 2001 and 200295. 
 
The paramilitary of Casanare have their origins in the cattle ranching families of the 
llanos, who have traditionally controlled land and wealth in the Department, with 
strong family links with Boyaca. During the post-Violencia years, lawlessness, cattle 
theft and land invasions of estates were rife. Protecting estates of sometimes 10,000 
hectares was very difficult without state security forces. This led the ranchers to 
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create their own armed guards96. In the 1980s, a rural force of the Colombian 
intelligence service, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS-Rural) was 
created in Casanare, and its training school in Aguazul specialised in cattle theft. The 
men whose livelihoods centred on defending the cattle ranches were probably the 
subsequent basis of what one Casanareño described to me as paramilitarismo criollo 
(creole paramilitarism).  
 
The paramilitary project in Colombia grew out of the sense that “if you have land you 
have rights”; Castaño, founder of the united paramilitary group the AUC, refers in his 
book to the many fiefdoms with armed power in the regions, among them “el de los 
ganaderos de Yopal” (the one belonging to the ranchers of Yopal, the capital of 
Casanare) 97. The links between paramilitary groups and large landowning interests is 
very clear. The municipalities where 80-99% of the land is in the hands of large and 
very large properties, are today heartlands of paramilitary power in Casanare: Orocué 
(99%), San Luis de Palenque(96.2%), Trinidad (94.8%) and Maní (89.5%), while Paz 
de Aríporo (89.6%), and  Hato Corozal (97.20%)98 are strategic municipalites close to 
the border with Arauca where the FARC launched a major offensive in 200099 . The 
extensive territory controlled by the paramilitary in the plains through their 
relationship to the ranchers has given them a strong base from which to erode and 
eliminate guerrilla influence in the Piedemonte foothills, and they rapidly became the 
ascendant force in Casanare which only the FARC seriously contested by the late 
1990s.  
 
The paramilitary are not however a united front in Casanare. There are at least two, 
perhaps three paramilitary groups100. The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia: Norte y 
Centro del Casanare are supported by Castaño’s own paramilitary group, the Auto 
Defensas de Cordoba and Uraba. It is a kind of mercenary army of people from 
outside the Department and linked into the great national conflict, seeking resources 
to help them with this larger scale project and preventing the FARC expansion into 
the territory. They operate in the northern open territory and frontier region with 
Arauca. They are reported to have a presence in 11 of Casanare’s 19 municipalities, 
including a strong presence in Yopal, and their aim is to take control of La Salina, 
Sácama, Nunchía and Támara, where the guerrillas have strong influence101. 
 
The other paramilitary group is the Autodefensas Campesinos del Sur de Casanare. 
reputed to have been founded by emerald dealer and drug smuggler, Victor Carranza, 
in the South of Casanare around Villanueva, Monterrey and Tauramena. Carranza had 
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local links with traditional cattle ranchers of the region, and young men from the area 
went to work in the emerald mines and the coca laboratories of Guaviare and Vichada 
in the 1980s, investing their money in land and laboratories back home having 
absorbed some of the most violent cultures in Colombia. Private armies were set up to 
guard these acquisitions. These municipalities of the South are reputed to have some 
of the largest cocaine laboratories in Colombia. Carranza himself began buying land 
in various municipalities of Casanare in the 1980s. Alejandro Reyes has calculated 
that 43% of Casanare’s municipalities have seen land purchased by drug 
traffickers102. Some traditional ranchers were happy to sell up given the situation in 
the region, particularly at prices that drugs traffickers were willing to pay The 
boundary between legal and illegal economic activities was gradually erased in the 
South and a semi mafia type economy emerged. The new mafia elite was ready to 
confront the growing guerrilla threat in the region.103.These were the origins of the 
Autodefensas del Sur, formally founded in 1995 but with antecedents in the late 
1980s104. Carranza himself has been in prison for a number of years and his 
relationship with the paramilitary group he helped found is not clear. It is known that 
a major internal dispute and change of command took place within the Autodefensas 
del Sur in 2000 and which led to the murder of Victor Feliciano, drug trafficker and 
landowner, together with his entire family105 and the subsequent rise of the much 
feared paramilitary commander known as HK.  
 
Local people see the paramilitary as criminals and killers and they create an 
atmosphere of terror106. Where criminality begins and ends with these paramilitary 
groups is not easy to judge, and a number of criminal gangs also operate in Casanare. 
But the levels of violence and crime in the Department increased notably from  1990 
and particularly after 1998 . There is possibly a correlation between the shift to a 
qualitative and quantitative escalation in the violence around 1998 shortly after the 
completion of the Cupiagua CPF and the end of major employment opportunities in 
the oil industry’s construction works107.In 1996, there were 231 murders in Casanare 
and 21 kidnappings, 41 in Yopal, and 73 in Aguazul108in 1997 the figure was 262, 
with 46 kidnappings and 217 displaced people. The Defensor described the situation 
in an interview with the author in 1997 as a “dispersed massacre”, in that killings 
were selective and individual, disguising the growing numbers . By 1998, the figure 
reached a new peak of 322, declining only slightly to 257 in 1999 and 309 in  2000, 
making a total of 888 for the three years 1998-2000109 Twenty nine of these killings 
were considered to be massacres in that they involved multiple murders; ten of the 
massacres were attributed to the paramilitary and two to the guerrillas. Seventeen 
 29
were carried out by “unknowns”. The number of kidnappings over the three years 
were 147, of which the guerrillas were responsible for 97 and the paramilitary for 26, 
and common criminals for 24. An indication of the rise in combat in these years, is 
the estimated figure of 4,084 displaced over the three years, with the figure doubling 
every year.110.  
 
By the end of the decade, civilian authority and civilian space in Casanare struggled 
to maintain room for manoevre in the face of the territorial and rent-seeking 
competition of the armed groups. The 16th Brigade of the armed forces was mostly 
engaged in the defence of the oil industry; the police were in the frontline of guerilla 
attacks in municipalities, and in the capital had to deal with the paramilitary presence 
and were swamped by the everyday violence and criminality. All the armed actors are 
present in Yopal, although the paramilitary dominate. A growing number of displaced 
people from the conflicts in other municipalities also arrive destitute to the capital, a 
number have been the victims of land seizures by paramilitaries111. While 80% of 
displaced people are from within the Department, a further 20% come to Yopal 
fleeing the conflict elsewhere in Colombia. There are few places of safety anywhere 
in Colombia today. 
 
CIVIL INTERACTION WITH THE MULTIPOLAR MILITARIZATION OF CASANARE  
 
What role did the discovery of oil play in the militarization of Casanare? At one level, 
that story has been told. It offered the opportunity for rent-seeking. However, that 
doesn't explain the contingent contextual factors that enabled this rent-seeking to take 
place, and how military actors were able to absorb, marginalise and eliminate civilian 
democratic ones. A distinction also has to be made between the fact that the arrival of 
oil can generate conflict for a number of reasons, but this doesn't make it a source of 
armed conflict, except in exceptional circumstances. In Casanare the social conflicts 
generated by oil and the misuse of oil revenues by weak local institutions ran in 
parallel with the rise of armed groups. The latter began to overwhelm the fragile but 
by no means non-existent civilian and democratic dynamics. Poverty and inequality 
had created resentments in Casanare long before the oil industry arrived; by 1995, the 
average income per capita was US $930 compared to US$ 1850 for Colombia as a 
whole, and 47% of the population did not have their basic needs met112. It took a 
surprisingly few number of armed men to intervene in this environment and re-shape 
it, reinforcing the importance given here to their interactions with civilian processes. 
Although statistics are by no means reliable and the figures are only indicative, the 
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study by the Corporación Excelencia de Justicia  in 2001, cites an approximate 
number of 340 armed insurgents of the FARC and around 100 for the ELN113 in 
Casanare; the police of Yopal quoted a figure of 500 paramilitary members114. The 
army, on the other hand, has around 3,000 troops in Casanare.. 
 
This section will look at how civilian life has become militarized through these 
interactions. A prevention strategy for Casanare would have had to prioritise 
unequivocally the strengthening of its civilian, judicial and democratic forces. While 
the Colombian national government began to decentralise in the late 1988s and took 
some steps to open up participation in the 1991 Constitution, these initiatives were 
not accompanied by a simultaneous programme of institutional strengthening. 
 
Oil had a clear impact on the demographics of Casanare, whose population was 
89,186 in 1973;the largest town was Yopal with a population of 24,517115. By 1994 it 
had reached 150,000 and Yopal 27,499 and by 2001, the population was calculated to 
be 300,000 and Yopal's 79,521116. An estimated 47% of population growth was 
concentrated in the two oil municipalities, Tauramena and Aguazul, and Yopal. A 
population that was 70% based in rural areas in 1990, was only 53% rural in 2001117. 
Yopal's rate of growth is similar to that of Arauca, and those of Aguazul and 
Tauramena comparable to Arauquita and Cravo Norte in the neighbouring oil 
producing Department118. The process of constructing an oil production facility is the 
most labour intensive period for the oil industry, in which infrastructure is built and 
services required for skilled and unskilled labour. Labour requirements decline 
considerably once production starts. The key years for Casanare were 1993-1998 
when the final phase of the extension of the installations (Centro de Facilidades de 
Producción or CPF) of Cusiana took place and the completion of the CPF in 
Cupiagua. The expectations of a bonanza in Casanare were created through headlines 
in the national newspaper, El Tiempo (June 1993), such as "The bonanza of Cusiana 
begins. Municipalities and departments will receive US $3,500 million in eleven 
years"119 An estimated 12,000 jobs were created between 1994 and 1996 and at this 
time some 80 people a day were arriving in Casanare. In the first six months of 1996 
6,000 people arrived in Yopal, 1,800 in Aguazul and 2,300 in Tauramena120 .By 1996, 
58% of the population of Tauramena, 20% of Aguazul and 14% of that of Yopal were 
working directly for the oil industry and many others were indirectly associated, 
though services in restaurants, hotels and domestic labour121. A great deal of the 
unskilled labour is hired on 28 day contracts, and the fence-hangers or malleros hang 
outside the perimeter fence competing for these contracts.122  
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Salaries in the oil industry were so much higher than elsewhere123, that the 28 day 
system was one of a number of rationing mechanisms for labour, in this case you 
would not be allowed to reapply for a contract for three months. Similar rationing 
occurred amongst contracts for services and this was in the hands of the 
neighbourhood councils or Juntas de Accion Communal. Numerous conflicts have 
arisen around these service and labour contracts.124 One of the tensions has been 
between the native population and the incomers. Fedesarrollo's study of the impact of 
the oil industry on Casanare found that the migrant workers in Casanare tended to 
come from higher socio-economic strata than most migrants to the large cities of 
Colombia, and to have a higher level of education than the native population125. The 
migrants were able to gain access to any work requiring higher skills than the local 
population generating huge resentments and demands for access to more skills 
training locally.  These resentments grew considerably after the completion of the 
construction phase of the installations and the decline in job opportunities, and it is at 
this moment that the paramilitary have tried to intervene and support the 
"communities". A migrant oil worker for Petrobrås, the Brazilian company with a 
small well in Mani, was found dead with the words: "muerto por sapo" (killed for 
being a grass), but people believe he was killed in 2002 by the paramilitary as a 
message to other migrant workers126. Local  politicians have begun to talk of the 
"Casanarization" of the region ie that jobs should only be for local born people. A 
decline in employment prospects has another potential impact on the armed conflict 
in the potential recruits for the armed groups amongst the unemployed. The armed 
groups offer subsistence and the paramilitary offer regular payment. 
 
Behind these resentments is the transformation of a time-honoured if impoverished 
form of life by the arrival of oil. A study in 1995127 of socio cultural transformations 
in Tauramena, records how in the 1980s "it was once a town lost in the llanos" with 
only  seven streets and a park. The author of the study watched while four 
discotheques were set up in two months and musical tastes of young people shifted to 
rock. The diet of the people began to change towards tinned food, the traditional 
platano no longer found a local market and began to be imported128. Rural dwellers 
began to drift from the land. Prostitution increased and shook a region known for its 
conservative family structure and values, and the migrants were also blamed for this. 
In a public forum in the early 1990s to discuss the impact of oil, the peasants 
association, ANUC, complained to the Ecopetrol representative about the "attack on 
and destruction of the family unit by the floating population known as the twenty-
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eighters, who are brought in by the oil companies instead of giving jobs to people 
native to the area. This results in the introduction of depravity, drugs and immorality, 
the effects of which have been seen with the first Aids cases in Yopal hospital"129The 
rise in alcoholism, crime and violence in the early 1990s in the context of an 
ineffective judicial system, would have contributed to the sense of uncontrolled social 
change and insecurity.  
 
In addition, there is evidence of a very high level of intrafamily violence that also 
contributed to the generalised insecurity and breakdown of affective relationships. 
This cannot be traced directly to the oil industry, but may have some connection with 
the generalised rise of fear and violence in the Department and its impact on 
masculine identities, in particular. In 1997, the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal 
y Ciencias Forenses (National Institution of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences) 
carried out a survey which put Casanare in the ranks of the highest levels of 
intrafamily violence in the country.  It had 171 cases for every 100,000 inhabitants, 
compared with 144 on average at the national level, with a very high level of 
matrimonial violence. By 2000, this was 151 cases per 100,000 inhabitants, in which 
Aguazul was between 3 and 3.9 times the national rate and Yopal, 2.0 and 2.9 
times130
 
Daily life changed for the people in the oil towns of Casanare and by the early 1990s, 
social action to complain at disruptions and potential damage to community life was 
mounting. The mishandling of these social protests was to cost BP its reputation 
locally, nationally and internationally and it has found it hard to recover. It remains 
exposed to further claims arising out of these years and subsequently, by individuals 
and groups who realised that a multinational can be vulnerable to reputation. It is here 
that the oil multinational becomes an actor in the conflictive processes that inevitably 
emerge when oil is found in a poor and peripheral region such as Casanare. A  
company of such size and power becomes the focal point of a myriad distinct 
complaints, some justified and others not. 
 
Social organisation was weak in Casanare in the 1980s in contrast to the 
mobilisations of the settlers in Arauca, but it was not non-existent. By the 1990s, the 
peasant associations ANUC had an estimated 35 organisations at the village and 
municipal level in Casanare131. While it helped organise a number of land invasions, 
it did not have the mass base it built in some other regions132. Between 1989 and 
1993, there were efforts to revitalise it through the leadership of Carlos Arrigui.  This 
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coincided with the rise of the oil industry in the region, the growing ELN presence in 
the Piedemonte, the establishment of the 16th Brigade of the armed forces charged 
with defending the oil industry, and the appearance of an organised response from the 
right. Another form of social organising which grew stronger in these years were the 
Juntas de Acción Comunal,  or neighbourhood councils. These grew from 502 in 
1988 to 888 in 1998, excluding the juntas of Villanueva133. The Juntas would become 
one of the main mechanisms for BP’s relationship with the communities. In addition, 
the idea that oil would bring new developments to communities and that BP were 
willing to help with social projects, led a number of communities to organise their 
own community development associations. These associations also became involved 
in protests about the impact of oil on their environment. An example would be 
Asoccocharte, an organisation of 12 hamlets in the village of Unión Charte, between 
Aguazul and Yopal134. Another is that of the Asociación Comunitaria para el 
Desarrollo Agroindustrial de El Morro(ACDAINSO, the Community Association for 
the Agroindustrial Development of El Morro).It is interesting to note that while the 
armed groups discussed above are dominated by male actors, women figure 
prominently in the arena of the Juntas and the community associations135. The erosion 
of safe public space to participate in Casanare, has been a particular loss for women’s 
voices. 
 
The difficulty for poor communities struggling around legitimate social demands in 
Casanare as elsewhere in Colombia, was not only that the guerrillas tried to infiltrate 
and influence these struggles, but that the armed forces and right wing paramilitary 
groups did not distinguish between such legitimate social struggles from sympathy 
for the guerrillas. In the political culture of Colombia, powerless and vulnerable 
communities have great difficulty forging strong and independent organisations. They 
are quickly seen as a clientele for the electoral purposes of political leaders, and as 
the militarization of Casanare progressed, for the interests of armed groups. In turn, 
these communities often seek interlocutors and mediators who can help them pursue 
and present their demands. Community action can be easily discredited in these 
conditions. Community organisation is often weakened through the divisions created 
and the murder of community leaders leaves a lasting legacy of resentment that can 
lay the basis for ongoing conflicts, particularly when the murder goes unpunished. 
The murder of Carlos Arrigui in April 1995 is an example; the murder came just over 
a year after he had led El Morro in a civic strike against BP. Although the Procurator 
General investigated the circumstances surrounding Arrigui’s murder136, the report 
does not reflect a very thorough investigation. It concluded that the murder was 
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probably the responsibility of the security forces and a result of Arrigui’s community 
activities, and indeed an army intelligence officer, Luis Alfredo Soler Gomez, was 
arrested. The officer was later seen “living comfortably” in the army barracks in 
1998.137   
 
BP’s relationship with ACDAINSO and the community of El Morro, is an example of 
the complexities and risks surrounding social organisational dynamics in Colombia 
and which needed to have been better understood by the company. Around 1993, the 
community of El Morro, which is situated in the midst of La Floreña, a small field in 
an early phase of exploration at this time, began to protest at damage to the road used 
by the community from the machinery and trucks driving up and down to reach the 
wells and the seismic tests taking place in the area. The report of the Defensoria into 
the case, wrote that the main complaints from the people were that “the dynamite is 
placed around the rivers, ravines and springs, drying up, in many cases, the water 
source, fracturing the earth, felling the forests and affecting the fauna”138. It also 
found that the community was facing other problems, such as the location of an army 
base in its midst to defend the wells, and that the army was responsible for water 
contamination and leaving rubbish in the peasant’s fields. It also points out that the 
communities themselves originally upset the fragile ecosystem of the area when they 
deforested the land in order to settle it and clear it for farming..139
 
The El Morro community is a corregimiento of Yopal, a community of 6 hamlets 
with a population of 1,500 people. The community are mostly colonisers from one of 
the poorest municipalities of Labranza Grande in Boyaca. The Colombian think tank, 
Fedesarrollo included El Morro in its study of the impact of oil on Casanare and 
identified it as a community in a “poverty trap”. Despite considerable infrastructural 
development since 1994 and the tarmacking of the road following an agreement with 
BP, El Morro stands out today for the exceptionally low level of education of adults 
and children and the high levels of child labour, around 20%140. The hopes of this 
community that oil could offer for a way out of this poverty trap, its frustrations as 
such hopes failed to materialise and its sense of powerlessness in the face of large 
scale and poorly understood transformations around them, were behind the civic 
strike that took place in January 1994.  
 
BP made a critical mistake at a key point in the evolution of the conflict of Casanare 
of failing to understand the wider implications of the actions of this very small 
community. Its relationships with the community at this time were based on an old 
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fashioned benevolent paternalism141 while it concentrated strategically on the security 
of the enterprise. This was in the hands of the Colombian armed forces and a private, 
security company Defence Systems Colombia, part of the multinational security 
company, Defense Systems Limited. Following the civic strike, a number of 
community leaders were threatened. It was alleged that BP security employees were 
filming and photographing community leaders and meetings and handing these to the 
army. These allegations together with the murder of Arrigui came to the attention of 
the British press. Between  1996 and 1998, BP became headline news in the UK 
press, the subject of at least two major television documentaries, a visit from a 
European Parliament delegation, human rights protests against it in the UK, a debate 
in the House of Lords and a report by Human Rights Watch142. An investigation by 
the Public Prosecutor or Fiscalía  and published in 1998 found no evidence to 
substantiate the allegations against BP and the company was exonerated.143. Several 
new allegations were made against BP and DSC in 1998, around police training and 
the security of the OCENSA pipeline144 and against BP for environmental 
infringements. An inter-agency group of UK NGOs (Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, 
Christian Aid, CAFOD and CIIR) was set up to engage in a dialogue with BP around 
these allegations. 
 
The international focus on BP’s role in Casanare contributed to a major rethink in the 
company around its handling of the situation (see below). In the meantime, the armed 
groups extended their predatory advances. A qualitative shift in the conflict took 
place, as growing paramilitary control led to the FARC offensive, while the ELN’s 
military decline led them to extend their efforts at extortion through kidnapping and 
“taxing” local contractors.  
 
The main political actors in Casanare were traditionally a political elite whose 
expectations were to control electoral positions in the key municipal and departmental 
offices and make the personal gains that accompanied this. It was not a respected 
institutionality, but it was the only one there was and enjoyed some legitimacy for 
that reason alone, better some institutionality than none at all. In the late 1980s, the 
Colombia government promoted a decentralisation process aimed partly at opening 
up political participation. This included the direct elections of mayors in 1988. But it 
was a decentralisation to weak institutions and to a political sphere characterised by 
the patron-client relationship that was easily manipulated, as we saw in the case of 
Arauca. This did not mean that all who attempted to represent their communities were 
caught up in corruption. An emphasis on contingent contexts is that they require, in 
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this discussion of the political arena, discrimination between those committed to a 
public interest, those who would be committed if the incentives are right, and those 
with only personal interests in mind. In Casanare, there are examples of all of these. 
But what is clear, is that the space to be neutral and act for the public interest became 
more and more restricted as armed actors increased their power over civilian ones, 
now in charge of the oil revenues that started flowing to Casanare from 1993. The 
precise relationship between the rise of armed groups, oil revenues and the agendas of 
political elites is not easy to untangle . In order to get elected, candidates have to 
make deals with armed groups, particularly the paramilitary but also the guerrillas in 
the municipalities they control. These deals involve access to the revenues of the 
municipality after the election and refusal to comply means death. Two mayors of 
Aguazul have been murdered and many live under permanent threat. Many 
politicians, up to and including the Departmental Governor, live in a state of 
ambivalence between a wish to carry out their political duties and their need to 
appease the armed groups around them145 Oil royalties, it can be argued, weakened 
rather that strengthened Casanare’s fragile political institutionality. 
 
Oil produced very high levels of growth in Casanare. 146 Between 1995 and 1998 
Casanare received 33% of the total royalties distributed to oil producing regions, 
compared to 28% to Arauca, and 7% to Meta, Huila and La Guajira; by 2000 
Arauca’s share had decline to 12% compared to a rise in those of Casanare to 35%.147.  
Between 1994 and 1998, the aggregate value of the Department’s contribution to 
National GDP increased to 2% while in Arauca it declined from 1.1% to 0.7%148. The 
structure of production was transformed;  agriculture and cattle diminished 
considerably their economic contribution to GDP, but african palm production and 
cattle remained significant economic activities. The contribution of agriculture and 
cattle to the Departmental GDP decreased from 10% and 50% in 1985 respectively to 
9% and 11% in 1993, while oil rose from 12.5 % to 45%.  
 
The Fedesarrollo study of the impact of oil on public finances in Casanare illustrates 
the potential and the dangers of the income the region began to receive, particularly 
the municipalities of Aguazul and Tauramena. 149. These municipalities came to 
depend on royalities for 45% of their income, compared to the dependence of 
between 65 and 90% of income from the national government of non oil producing 
municipalities of a similar size. At the departmental level, the contribution of 
royalties within total income was even more significative than at the municipal level, 
rising from 70% in 1996 to 74.% in 2000.  In addition to the royalties, the rise in 
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commerce between 1991 and 1996 was very high and became an important source of 
municipal and departmental taxation revenue (and indirectly, for extortion by armed 
groups).  Casanare ended up with the highest investment resources per capita in the 
country, 30 times those of the poorest departments of Chocó and Vichada and similar 
to that of a relatively wealthy department such as Cundinamarca with 9 times its 
population. Considerable infrastructural investment was made with these royalties 
and Fedesarrollo found that public services and educational coverage were by 2002 
not very different to those of other large towns in the country. The quality of 
education remains a problem and the informal nature of much unemployment has 
affected affiliation to the national health programme and pensions. But while 
provision and access to basic services has improved markedly, these soon become 
taken for granted as people search for improved employment and income. Casanare 
has not achieved sustainable human development despite its oil bonanza."There is no 
development , only infrastructure", was the view of a group of grass roots women I 
interviewed in Yopal.150 And even with the improvements  in infrastructural 
development, Casanare cannot officially account for the massive US$800 million it 
has received in royalties from Cusiana/Cupiagua between 1993 and 2000.  
 
The audited royalties accounts for the Department for 2001 prepared by the 
Contraloria de Departamento, are very revealing on the investment profile.  The 
municipality of Aguazul for instant spent 41.3 billion pesos in 2001, of which 7.6 
billion went on roads, and 5.2 billion on debt servicing, compared to 3.1 billion on the 
agriculture and production sector. The armed forces, it is interesting to note, receive a 
5% cut on road building due to the security importance of this investment151. Another 
problem in the expenditure on infrastructure is the quality of the works and the 
tendency for companies to charge much higher costs. It is never clear whether these 
costs include the vacuna or tax to one or other armed group, as is often claimed to 
justify these costs. Corruption undoubtedly accounts for a considerable loss in royalty 
revenue. Fedesarrollo found that with the resources it received, the municipalities of 
Casanare could have easily achieved a 100% coverage of health, education and basic 
sanitation investing only the resources of the years 1998 and 1999152
 
In addition to corruption and the siphoning of resources to armed actors, there is an 
economic bottleneck which emerges when a sudden influx of oil revenues reaches a 
Department with a weak existing resource base. The fiscal bottleneck is due to the 
increase in current account expenditure at a greater pace than the total resources or 
existing savings. Increased revenues from royalties ironically led to greater 
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indebtedness at the municipal and Departmental level and an inability to generate 
savings which might reduce the ever greater dependency on royalties. Any major 
downward shift in oil prices could create a major problem of short term insolvency, 
which in the climate of Casanare could be very dangerous.  
 
The 1998 Plan for Casanare produced by the Departmental Planning Administration 
acknowledge the profound institutional weakness in the Department, “The 
Department currently lacks a functioning and accountable structure which would 
enable it to provide the decision-making processes for planning and management”153. 
Yet while this was acknowledged in 1998, that year marked an escalation in the levels 
of violence and extortion. Interviews in 2001 and 2002 with the main institutions 
charged with introducing accountability and legality into Casanare154, found them all 
under tremendous pressure from the volume of cases and from the threats they 
received from armed groups. The Defensor  or people’s ombudsman, had to go into 
exile in October 2000 after a bomb was placed under his car. In May 2001, the 
paramilitary ordered two Fiscales or prosecutors to present themselves in Tauramena. 
After they failed to do this at the second demand, they were told that one of the 
Fiscales would be shot. 155. The Procurator General was in despair at his inability to 
investigate all the cases that came to him, and even when he did carry out 
investigations he could not gain a prosecution, due to threats on him or the Fiscal.
 
Civilian authority had been greatly undermined by the late 1990s in Casanare. 
Nevertheless, there were still voices and organisations that were trying to keep the 
civilian space open. This paper has argued that there were contingent moments when 
institutional and social decomposition might have been avoided or at least mitigated. 
To achieve this, it would have been vital to support those voices and organisations 
from the very beginning of the discovery of oil.  
 
By the late 1980s, there were a generation of young professionals who were 
concerned with the development of the region. They were prepared to act 
independently of the traditional elite political families and challenge their clientelistic 
political culture. Some founded NGOs, such as Cemilla in Yopal and the Fundación 
para el Desarrollo de Upía in Villanueva. The latter had proposed a participatory 
regional approach to the development of Casanare in the early 1990s to overcome 
disarticulation and fragmentation. A space for participation from different social 
sectors and organisations would it was argued at the time, offer a strong local 
interlocutor to the oil industry, as “the weaker the community, the worse is the impact 
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of oil”156. The Barco government’s Programme Nacional de Rehabilitación(National 
Rehabilitation Programme or PNR) which targeted the conflictive areas of Colombia, 
had arrived in Yopal in 1991, and had been supportive of participatiory approaches. 
The Governor at the time had supported the idea and Consejos de Participación  
(Participation Councils) had been set up between 1992 and 1994 but had been closed 
by the next Governor of the Department, as was the PNR by a later national 
administration.  
 
Many of this generation of professionals have come to occupy key roles in the 
institutions of government as well as in the private sector and the Chamber of 
Commerce. They have remained committed to the Department despite the war, and 
could, they argue, have been the core of an alliance to construct a more sustainable 
institutionality based on a region-wide development strategy. Many feel that the 
national state undermines rather than strengthens such capacity. The Contraloría  in 
charge of investigating corruption finds that rather than greater support for him to 
exercise his investigative role, the government cuts his budget and seeks to establish a 
new outside body to audit the Departmental Contralorías,  “Strengthen Us”! he 
lamented in an interview. 157. A strategic national plan of institutional strengthening 
in Casanare, would have also prioritised the judiciary and included regular support 
from national teams when local people are threatened. Impunity positively fosters 
violence.  
 
A serious pre-emptive plan for Casanare should have involved a recognition of the 
importance of the grass roots developmental, womens’ and environmental groups to 
the democratic process in the Department. This required effective security for citizens 
and measures to ensure that the security forces, in particular the armed forces, were 
themselves accountable to the rule of law not above it. The widespread belief and 
considerable evidence that the army has colluded with the paramilitary in cruel 
actions against social activists and prioritised the defence of the oil industry over the 
civilian population, has created a great deal of cynicism towards the security forces of 
the state. Civilian security is guaranteed for no-one, and those who try to keep an 
independent voice frequently risk their lives. Nevertheless, there are still social 
activists in Casanare who dare to do this.The march to the central square in Yopal in 
November 2001 by some 50 women to commemorate the International Day of Non-
Violence against Women, illustrates that despite the militarization of Casanare, some 
are prepared to defend the civilian space no matter what. 
 
 40
Finally, regional institutions should have been prepared for the influx of royalties and 
transparent and democratic mechanisms of accountability and decision-making 
established. The royalties have been a major source of indirect predation by armed 
groups and the weakening of local authority structures. The government intimated in 
2002 that it would consider re-centralising control of the royalty payments. The 
proposal would guarantee central government expenditure on education, health and 
other local social and infrastructural expenditure. The initiative is a response to the 
evidence of corruption and ineffective local administration, but also question the high 
percentage of royalties that go to the oil producing regions. There is some logic to 
guaranteeing the redistributive and appropriate use of revenues centrally, although 
this depends on the capacity of the central government which must remain doubtful in 
Colombia. But this belated proposal is likely to create a renewed crisis in Casanare 
and my interviews in 2002 revealed that it was already provoking political unrest as 
local elites and professionals alike contested the erosion of power and room for 
manoeuvre it would imply. Casanare has not yet achieved anything resembling 
sustainable development, they argued. While there is considerable infrastructural 
development, royalties should now be redirected towards the productive sector158. 
 
This paper argues that policy failure at the level of the national government has 
contributed to the opportunities for predation by armed groups both in Arauca and 
Casanare . An antibiosis or antagonistic interaction emerged between the civil and 
uncivil processes in the regions, which led ultimately but not inevitably to the 
triumph of the latter over the former. On the one hand, a considerable financial boom 
took place in regions of weak and poorly prepared institutions, disarticulated 
territories and clientelistic political practices. Expected and real revenues created new 
socio-economic dynamics, which institutions could not handle. At the same time, 
armed groups began to make use of the opportunities for predation which opened up 
and interacted with the civilians who controlled the fragile institutions, made 
vulnerable by the lack of shared norms which underpinned them. Gradually the 
uncivil gained inroads into the civil world, corrupting political representatives, killing 
and threatening independent social activities and siphoning resources to strengthen 
armed confrontation. In an investigation into the judicial system in Casanare, the 
Department was described to a team of interviewers as in a state of “co-government” 
with armed groups159. This was not a one-off but an evolving process, in which the 
national government might have intervened to prevent the outcome which by 1988 in 
Arauca and 1998 in Casanare had become clear: a level of militarization of civilian 
life which would be very difficult to reverse. But if one can attribute policy failure to 
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the national government, what might one attribute to the main multinational company 
operating in the region? And how has the oil industry responded to the dilemmas of 
extracting oil in a such a complex, militarised environment? 
 
 
BEYOND THE PERIMETER FENCE: THE OIL 
INDUSTRY AND NEW RESPONSES TO 
CONFLICT 
 
FROM DEFENSE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY TO SECURITY OF THE OIL 
PRODUCING COMMUNITY 
 
Policy failure in Colombia has often been about a policy vacuum as much as wrong 
or misguided policies. It could be argued that this is very evidently the case with 
respect to the oil industry. Occidental opted in the 1980s to take the easier but 
ultimately highly damaging route to defend its oil interests partly as a result of the 
lack of any state direction that would have made the company accountable to a 
national policy environment or provided alternative forms of security. By the late 
1990s, individual companies and the Asociación Colombiana de Petroleo (Colombian 
Petroleum Association, ACP) had been forced to develop their own approach to the 
protection of their industry. In doing this, they have tried to make a distinction 
between defending the industry, and the security of the industry in its entorno or 
socio-political environment. This has involved them engaging actively with the 
communities and political structures around them. 
 
The ACP was founded in 1965 but until the 1990s had not developed a clear set of 
strategies for the industry as a whole. Different policies were implemented in 
different regions and by individual companies, and a military and defensive approach 
dominated. The Association or Gremio as is it called in Colombia, is a relatively 
weak pressure group compared to the historic power of the coffee producers 
federation.  As oil has overtaken coffee as the country’s major export, it has not been 
able to replicate that power, which is partly explained by the number of foreign 
companies within the ACP and the sensitivities around such companies trying to exert 
political influence over areas of Colombian national policy. As the Colombian 
government has gone into overdrive to attract foreign investment, many new 
companies of varying size have come to Colombia; an estimated 70 were operating 
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by 2002160. The capacity of these companies to deal with the violent environment in 
which exploration and production must take place in Colombia varies a great deal. BP 
Amoco cannot be compared to some of the small companies which do not have the 
resources to develop sophisticated monitoring of environmental impact or to afford 
the same level of security from the armed forces. But nor are they the same high 
profile target as a huge multinational such as BP. The ACP has begun to foster some 
coherence amongst the different kinds of companies operating in the sector. 
 
The ACP has made serious efforts over the last five years or so to both persuade the 
State to develop a coherent security policy as well as forging its own. It was evidently 
not possible to protect the whole length of a 490 mile pipeline. It only takes 2-3 
people to blow it up. In addition, when companies are asked to pay the armed groups, 
they need a strategy and a framework with which to respond161. The ACP has been 
trying to develop such a framework that can offer a coherent and shared ethical 
approach agreed across the industry including foreign companies, Ecopetrol, oil 
workers and contractors. Ecopetrol has developed its own parallel discussion, but 
worked closely with the ACP.  
 
The ACP has promoted national forums162, and the establishment of regional Mesas 
de Trabajo (Work Tables) which bring together the different companies exploring and 
producing in particular regions together with Ecopetrol. In the course of the 1990s, 
but particularly in the years 1999-2002, they have been established with different 
levels of permanence163 .Companies have responded more as the situation has grown 
increasingly serious for the petroleum as well as the energy sector as a whole.  
 
By 2001 in its first Forum in Paipa164, the sector was recognising that it faced three 
serious threats from armed groups to the security of its employees and contract 
workers, its physical infrastructure and its profitability. The armed groups saw the 
industry as an opportunity for extortion, pressure and the expression of political 
demands. The industry considered itself in the middle of the confrontation between 
the guerrillas and self-defence groups for control of wealth production in the regions 
(oil, coca, opium, electricity generation, ranching, mining and industry), control of 
strategic corridors, and the means to pressure the government for specific demands, 
such as the destruction of electricity pylons and local armed strikes. The industry’s 
costs have mounted in terms of the security of infrastructure and people, in repairs, in 
transport, in prevention and in legal services. Labour relations have deterioriated, 
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project implementation has been delayed and the economic competitivity of the sector 
was deemed to be at risk.  
 
The idea of regional committees emerged first in the Central and Alto Magdalena in 
1991. Hocol was a leading player in the process in this region.This company is 
Colombian registered but with shareholders from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. A 
change in ownership and control took place when Shell withdrew in 1992. It was this 
withdrawal that forced the company to face up to its environment in a new way. 
Under Shell, there was a feeling that it merely implemented a schema which had been 
developed overseas165. Both this and the BP study to follow, reinforce the argument 
that when Colombian professionals are involved in the policy development process 
we are discussing, they have both more knowledge and more at stake in “getting it 
right”. Hocol had a long history of some forty years of operating in FARC controlled 
territory in Huila. Local people had been incorporated into the business from early on, 
so that the company had a fairly strong acceptance in the region before conflict 
escalated. In 1991 during the discussion around the new constitution, the company 
began to accept the idea of business ethics, at the same time as it recognised the need 
for a state of law in Colombia and its own obligations towards that. Hocol’s outreach 
to the community had emphasised leadership training, which had created political 
formation in the community and enabled the local people to resist manipulation by 
third forces, from the FARC to party political bosses. A reasonable co-existence had 
been forged in which the autonomous civilian space appears to have maintained more 
integrity than is the norm in Colombia. The situation began to deterorate when the 
FARC got involved in the drugs industry and when rather than a group of armed 
peasants, its members began to appear in uniform and evolve into an army. The 
company had to develop a policy towards extortion and other threats. But while in 
1992 when the company suffered its first armed attack it was easily able to resist it 
and the community themselves marched against the increase in violence, by 1998, the 
situation had evidently worsened, and the company was attacked in 1999 and again in 
2001, when 100 armed men broke into one of the most important installations. 
Although the FARC predominate in the territory, by this time the paramilitary were 
regularly invading, common crime and violence were mounting amidst rising 
unemployment and population displacement . 
 
In the meantime, the company had begun to shift its social outreach. It began to 
develop a programme with its contract workers and to involve the community as a 
stakeholder in strategies to deal with the militarising dynamics. It did not wish to 
 44
work with the army or the police and as a small company it could not afford a costly 
arrangement with the state security forces anyway. It did seek more help from the 
state. In the absence of such help, it has sometimes taken the decision to wait rather 
than go into production, a decision recently taken about an exploration bloc in 
Caqueta, in the heartland of FARC territory. The company does not have a security 
department, but analyses scenarios. It has developed a cultura de auto cuidado or a 
culture of self-awareness and protection amongst its employees, to encourage 
sensitivity to the security situation and anticipation of dangers, such as that of 
kidnapping. It has identified some critical principles: a non paternalistic approach, 
working with the community, not substituting for the state, the goal of sustainability, 
and a tripartite strategy between state, community and company166. The company has 
spent a year preparing to operationalise a new bloc in Casanare, which has involved 
an almost anthropological approach of “getting to know how Casanare thinks”167. 
 
These ideas have fed into the evolving strategy of the ACP which has taken the form 
of a tripartite scheme between the state, the community and the company. The 
strategy is different from the “social works” approach of the past, in which the 
company built what it thought the community wanted, such as a school. It might then 
find that the state would not or could not provide teachers. The new framework of 
gestión social or social management aims to involve the community as well as other 
local actors in all stages of the process of defining local needs. This framework 
should not, argues the ACP, be a tool for improving security. It should be a genuine 
effort to promote peaceful coexistence in cooperation with all the communities in the 
area of oil exploration or production.  
 
The success of the strategy nevertheless, argues the ACP, still depends on the State. 
The petroleum sector cannot divorce itself from national processes and the work of 
Regional Committees and Ecopetrol is heavily dependent on the evolution of the war 
and the peace process. An Arab company that debated between a strategy based on  
gestion social only, the army and police only, or both, opted for the former. Sixteen of 
its employees were subsequently kidnapped. The company has sought to involve the 
departmental Governor in a protection strategy. 
 
As kidnappings, attacks, bombs and dynamiting have increased, the issue of physical 
protection alongside the community outreach and partnership building strategy 
remains a critical one for the industry. Without the rule of law, effectively 
administered by state institutions, the industry remains very vulnerable. It has 
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urgently sought action from the government, to support beleaguered institutions 
operating in the midst of the conflict and to provide the objective conditions for 
security. Each oil producing region varies according to the degree to which its local 
institutions function. Huila retains some institutional infrastructure while Arauca has 
lost much of this and what remains has been severely affected by the loss of royalties 
due to the pipeline damage. “We can’t replace the state, but the state must give 
protection” argues Alejandro Martínez , Executive President of the ACP168. But 
without an appropriate response from the state, the oil industry feels it has to act on 
its own. However, while the industry now has its ethical practices, its regional 
committees working with Ecopetrol, and its gestion social approach, it lacks a plan 
for security which will depend on effective state institutions. The aspiration is that 
improved and genuine relationships with communities will to some extent defend the 
companies that work with them, but the risks remain high. The ACP is convinced, 
despite the risks, that the security of the oil well cannot be divorced from the security 
of the community as a whole. Oil wells cannot be protected through military means; a 
greater guarantee is that judges are able to do their work and that there are institutions 
to control corruption.  
 
Efforts to persuade the national government to focus on this institutional effectiveness 
as a guarantor of security, have led the oil industry association into a broader political 
role, despite the tensions that arise, both with the foreign companies in its midst and 
from its own historic weakness as an association. This shift towards such advocacy of 
its interests, suggests that business in Colombia is having to change its traditional 
assumptions that the State was there to provide the macro-economic stability and 
order to allow the private sector to get on with its tasks of accumulation. This led it to 
allow the political class to control the state apparatus through the clientelistic 
practices that we have already explored. The evident weakening of the traditional 
political parties in Colombia has eroded that distancing mechanism for business 
interests. The business sector has had to become more pro-active in proposals for 
overcoming the crisis, and present its views on the future of Colombian society, just 
as the guerrillas and paramilitary and other civilian associations do.  Whether the 
Association will be able to develop further this engagement is uncertain. It was not 
consulted about the issue of US protection of the pipeline and recognises the danger 
that the US is seen to come into Colombia to protect its own, making it more 
legitimate to attack the oil industry as a whole. The strengthening of the armed 
capacity of the State with US assistance and the pursuit of a military solution to 
Colombia’s war, also runs the danger that the State will confuse and weaken the other 
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agenda of restoring legitimacy and effectiveness to Colombia’s institutions, the 
agenda that the ACP at least identifies as the priority need for the country and for the 
oil sector in particular.  
 
For the ACP security for the industry has come to mean more than its defence. A 
proactive, sincere and ethical engagement with the world outside the perimeter fence 
has been seen as a vital component of operating in a climate of violence. How far this 
nuanced and sensible strategy for the longer term vision of a democratic and equitable 
Colombia will survive if the US and the Colombian government succeed in 
strengthening the military responses of the State without simultaneously 
strengthening the civilian ones, remains a question mark. The last section looks at 
how BP have dealt with this dilemma in the context of Casanare. 
 
 
BRITISH PETROLEUM IN CASANARE: FROM  “SPLENDID ISOLATION” 
TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
 
BP was forced by the mid-1990s to recognise that however unjust it felt the 
accusations against its role in Casanare to be, as a huge and powerful multinational in 
a poor and violent region, it would be held responsible for much of what happened 
there. To its credit, it has had a serious rethink of its entire strategy and acknowledged 
mistakes. The Chief Executive, John Browne concluded in his 1998 Elliott Lecture at 
St Anthony’s College, Oxford: 
 
“…we’ve been accused in the last couple of years of being associated with 
serious human rights and environmental problems in Colombia. We’ve taken 
these allegations very seriously and gone through a very thorough process of 
investigation, internal and external. Having been through that process I’m 
convinced we were not guilty of the sort of wilful misconduct of which we’ve 
been accused. We made mistakes, but I don’t believe they were deliberate and 
we’ve learned from them. One of the things we’ve learned is that we can’t stand 
aside from the problems of the communities in which we work. We can’t try to 
operate in splendid isolation and cut ourselves off from local realities behind a 
security fence”169
 
      The Inter-Agency Group of Oxfam, Christian Aid, CIIR and CAFOD  which also 
investigated  the events surrounding the allegations against BP in 1998, did not find 
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evidence of “wilful misconduct”.  However, it concluded that BP had allowed its 
security concerns to dominate its understanding of the dynamics of the region, it 
“chose not to know what is happening in Casanare and listened to apparently “natural 
allies” such as the armed forces and political elites. Reluctance to acknowledge that 
their own security personnel might have been too close to the armed forces or that 
intelligence operations amongst civilians to protect a pipeline might result in extra-
judicial killings, have exposed BP to charges of complicity in abuses”170.  BP may 
have been ill-advised also from the British Foreign Office, which until the latter part 
of the 1990s did not acknowledge the importance of army and paramilitary violence 
in Colombia. As the Financial Times wrote: “The oil company sees the guerrillas 
behind many protests; while local people see BP protected by fortresses and behind 
armed guards and working with the army”171  
 
       The company had never ignored its social responsibility in the region, but this had 
been based on a rather benevolent paternalism which involved it responding to social 
demands without any strategic vision and trying to build good relationships with local 
politicians and professionals through invitations to London.  An evaluation visit by a 
team of three people from the World Bank in 1998, reviewed how BP had factored 
social concerns into the development of its operations172. It found that as early as 
1992, the company was facilitating communities to identify their development needs 
and priorities. Since 1993, it had “robust Community Affairs Policy dealing with 
interactions between the company and its stakeholders in Casanare”173 A community 
affairs budget of US$29 million between 1993 and 1997 financed a wide range of 
social investment activities to meet community expectations and at its peak in 1997, 
the company employed some 32 people to deal with community affairs. BP and its 
partner oil companies had established a local NGO, Amanecer to administer credit 
and other social programmes.  Nevertheless, the evaluation recognised that not all the 
approaches in Casanare to develop a relationship of mutual benefit to the company 
and its stakeholders have been successful”174. The evaluating team particularly 
emphasised the importance of BP building “effective partnerships between 
government, BPXC and civil society”175
 
      Internally, BP was going further than this evaluation.  It extracted four important 
lessons176: 
 
o The company cannot work in isolation from the rest of the region and offer 
direct investment only in the areas of operation. 
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o The Department’s long-term sustainable development can only be achieved 
by effective planning and better-trained leaders both in the community and 
the local governments 
o As a member of the community, BP cannot extricate itself from the conflict 
that affects everyone in Casanare. In sum, BP’s security concerns to hand and 
hand with those of the community. 
o Ecopetrol as the state partner of the operation has a role to play. BP should 
embrace that interest 
 
 By 1998, BP was downsizing its community affairs staff in post within Casanare and 
devolving responsibility for community affairs to operations managers so that it 
became   central to their concerns. The World Bank evaluation team warned about the 
need to maintain a team capable of communicating with local people and partners. BP 
did in fact appoint a particularly strong Bogota and Casanare team to take forward 
their new approach to the Department. A notable feature of this team is that as well as 
individuals with particular knowledge and experience in Casanare, it includes people 
with considerable prior experience of working with the PNR rehabilitation 
programme for conflict zones introduced by President Barco in the late 1980s. This 
Colombian team has a deep knowledge of the country and a strategic vision which 
reflects their understanding that as well as working for BP they are citizens of 
Colombia, with responsibility to their country as well as the multinational they work 
for. " We are talking about our children's patrimony" , as BP's Manager for Corporate 
Affairs expressed it.177
 
This team presents its strategy in terms of four levels of activities. The first is the 
establishment of a base-line of reliable and up to date data. It commissioned a study 
by the Colombian “think tank” Fedesarrollo, on the evolution of the social and 
economic development of Casanare which was published in 2002. The second is the 
creation and implementation of strategic partnerships; the third is managing the 
conflict and the fourth, preparing for the future.178 The latter refers to exploration in 
Niscota  which will effect the municipality of Nunchia in Casanare, an even poorer 
municipality than Aguazul and Tauramena when oil was discovered, as well as Paya 
in Boyaca. BP is making a serious effort not to repeat its errors with Cusiana-
Cupiagua, and if oil was discovered in Nunchia will be its test for its new approach to 
working in conflict.179.These four levels reflect also a statement of longer term 
commitment by BP to Casanare and its recognition that it must play a role in the 
future of the region from which it has profited through the extraction of oil. Rather 
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than extract the oil and abandon the region, BP has expressed it commitment to work 
with the state, community/civil society and the private sector to ensure that oil 
revenues are used for the development of the region and that it prepares for the 
reduction in those revenues: 
 
"BP's future is inextricably linked to Casanare's. How the region manages the 
challenges of reduced revenues within a conflict zone in the coming years 
will impact on oil development, present and future. Given this scenario, it 
would not seem wise, both from a business and social perspective, to sit back 
and watch as the neighbourhood deteriorates"180
 
The building of strategic partnerships has been one of the key means by which BP has 
sought to become a player amongst many players in the region. The oil industry 
should, in this conception, collaborate with others in building towards shared goals, 
rather than be the "cow to be milked" as it is often perceived. This attitude towards 
the oil industry has diverted attention and interest in state building locally and 
nationally. This strategic vision has led BP to promote what is known as the Grupo 
Gestor, a development task force involving key institutional actors in the region. The 
group meets to construct a consensus around a participative and sustainable 
development plan for Casanare and recovering democratic governance.181 To achieve 
this goal, BP is now working with some of the professionals referred to earlier, those 
that remain committed in some form to an integral human development approach and 
occupy important positions in local governmental and private sector institutions. It 
seeks to build a coalition of local leaders who could foster social consensus, a 
regional cultural identity and comprehend the multiple challenges at the economic, 
institutional, environmental, political and social level. In concrete terms, the Grupo 
Gestor  began at the end of 2001 to discuss how a regional development plan or Plan 
de Ordenamiento Territorial, might be the focus for strategic thinking and 
cooperation between state, private sector and community, with an emphasis on 
enhancing transparency and efficiency of public investment. 
 
At the same time, BP is working to strengthen the capacity within society to monitor 
institutions and to develop new leadership at other levels of society. It has supported a 
school for leadership, it has worked with women from Casanare through productive 
projects, women's rights and political participation, and with youth through music and 
theatre projects.. It has placed particular emphasis on the strengthening of the judicial 
system, and has promoted the Justices of Peace programme in Nunchia, Yopal, 
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Aguazul and Tauramena to develop legitimate ways for resolving daily conflicts 
which would take months in the formal legal arena. In the same spirit of improving 
relationships with local communities in oil producing areas , it has promoted a 
Neighbourhood for Development programme. BP continues to fund specific 
productive , health and infrastructural projects, but it has a strategic programme today 
rather than projects which respond to particular demands of the most vociferous 
communities and individuals.  
 
In the process, there is evidence of some shift in the meaning of security compared to 
the past. The 16th Brigade still defends BP's infrastructure. Following criticism after 
the events of the mid 1990s, it has made explicit its concern with human rights 
protection and promoted training of the armed forces in International Humanitarian 
Law in the 1998 agreement between Ecopetrol and the Ministry of Defence for the 
protection of oil installations. It has taken the auditing of this agreement much more 
seriously and committed itself to greater transparency.  Nevertheless, although 
accusations of human rights abuse against the army have declined, most believe that 
there is still tolerance of if not active collaboration with the paramilitary.  
 
Events since the fieldwork for this paper were completed suggest that these security 
dynamics around oil exploration areas in conflict zones remain highly problematic. 
Mathew Gitsham describes the way BP opted to work with the army to create a 
‘military ring’ around the village of Morcote, the chief beneficiary of any potential 
royalties from the Niscota exploration. This was to protect the communities from 
incursions from any armed groups. However, his interviews with Ecopetrol, revealed 
that there were neighbouring municipalities which hoped to benefit from royalties in 
Boyacá, such as Pisba Paya and Labranzagrande.  Paramilitary groups have targeted 
these municipalities which are outside the military ring in an effort to gain a foothold 
in the area. BP could not persuade the Colombian government to extend the military 
ring model which is very expensive.182
 
BP has recognised that reliance on the protection of armed men is not enough. It has 
begun to identify its own security with that of the security of civilians in Casanare. It 
has made this clear in statements such as "Violence against the community is a threat 
for everyone" 183, a notable change from the 1990s when its priority concern was 
defence of the oil industry against guerilla attack. More than this it has publicly 
condemned violent actions, joining with others in Casanare and identifying itself as a 
co-citizen in this respect. This represents significant changes from the past, 
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particularly given the escalation in the conflict and that fact that BP personnel are 
often shot at when travelling in helicopters; contract workers have been kidnapped 
and executed, and it is impossible for them to safely have a cup of coffee in Yopal 
without some protection on hand184
 
However, BP's new approach is not without its problems and contradictions. It is too 
early to judge whether the company can effectively become a partner in the 
development process of Casanare when other members of the partnership have been 
so severely weakened by the violence of the previous decade while it is seen as a very 
powerful actor still. This imbalance has created tensions in the idea of "partnership". 
It has tried to prevent itself being sucked into a state-like role by building 
relationships where possible with state institutions, such as the Departamento de 
Planeación or National Planning Department and to ensure that it works closely with 
the state oil company, Ecopetrol, in the region. But Ecopetrol still sees itself as the 
junior partner in many respects, that the power of the multinational to define an 
agenda in the region is much greater than theirs and gives the multinational a 
protagonism which should preferably be that of the state company.185. A similar sense 
that BP promotes an agenda that should be rightly taken forward by local actors also 
weakens the partnership relationship BP is attempting to build with the local 
professional class. In the context of Casanare, many find it hard to see how the 
strategic and participatory departmental planning process that BP is promoting can be 
realised in practice while people still do not share a vision of "Casanare" as a space 
and violent armed groups are intent on fighting over the spoils the Department has to 
offer.  
 
At the level of communities, BP has had a difficult task to overcome the mistrust 
generated from past mistakes although an opinion poll it commissioned in April  2001 
suggested that it was now beginning to do so186. It is still heavily criticised by 
environmental groups and by communities who are envisioning the end to 
employment opportunities. Associations of unemployed are emerging in some 
communities, while some of the women who led the struggles against BP and then 
learnt to negotiate with the company, have lost positions in the Juntas de Accion 
Comunal to a new leadership of individuals which aim to defend particular interests. 
The levels of fear are such that many no longer want to stand for President of the 
Juntas.  A community leader from a rural community of Aguazul, explained how 
much had been gained from the negotiations with BP, but now recognises that some 
young members of the community became lazy waiting for their turn to get their 
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labour contract. She felt that the community had not shared its bonanza enough with 
other municipalities187 .  
 
Violence and the climate of terror has torn apart the weak social fabric of Casanare 
and made BP's initiatives extremely difficult to implement. The company remains 
vulnerable to those wishing to damage its reputation, and it is extremely difficult to 
sort out genuine grievances from the oppportunistic and malicious. However, it is 
also clear that BP has played a very important role in opening up space for those who 
are interested in building a more peaceful and equitable Casanare.  Most people will 
also recognise that while there is some resentment towards the powerful 
multinational, its power has begun to be used also to open up opportunities for debate 
about the problems of the Department that it would be difficult to have otherwise.  
 
BP has taken a risk by coming out from the perimeter fence. Some would argue that it 
has had no choice. International monitoring has forced it to look at its role differently. 
The weakness of the national government has left it no choice but to build its own 
agendas for the Department in cooperation with other actors. Ultimately it is 
defending its commercial interests in a more appropriate way. However it is infinitely 
preferable that in pursuing its commercial interests a multinational assumes some 
responsibility for the territory it profits from. It is a marked advance from backing 
corrupt and repressive regimes as the oil industry once did. It is also an advance from 
"choosing not to ask questions" as BP did in its first period of engagement with 
Casanare.  
 
The danger is that the strategy will not produce quick results. It is a strategy that involves 
patient and time-consuming daily contact with a large number of individuals and groups. 
It requires a sensitivity to the conditions in which most people struggle to survive and 
ability to distinguish the genuine from the opportunistic collaboration. It depends on the 
local people gaining greater confidence, overcoming fear and mutual distrust in order to 
rebuild the social fabric and take back the power appropriated by the armed groups. It 
involves humility on the part of BP, that ultimately the future of Casanare will depend not 
on its vision but on the emergence of a new civil order, based on locally determined 
social and political process.  
 
In the meantime, the pursuit of military solutions by the national government supported 
by the United States, might offer another option to this painstaking work begun in 
Casanare. It can only be hoped that the vision of oil company security based on stronger 
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and effective institutions and democratic participation and partnerships will become more 
real before the temptation to pursue a military and authoritarian path overcomes it. A 
military solution to the problems of Colombia has been the road taken by President 
Alvaro Uribe since 2002, with considerable backing from the UK as well as US 
governments, alongside efforts to strengthen Colombian institutions. A process of 
negotiations with paramilitary groups was begun in 2003, but significantly, this has been 
resisted by the paramilitary of Casanare. In April 2004, Uribe went to Casanare for a 
Security Council meeting in Yopal provoked, it seems, by the failure of the paramilitary 
of Casanare to comply with the paramilitary ceasefire as well as formal complaints that 
they were extorting money and jobs from Casanare’s municipal authorities. He met with 
the Governor, the 17 mayors and the Defensor of Casanare. El Tiempo reported that ‘it is 
the first time that there has been a denunciation concerning the pressure by paramilitaries 
on mayors and local authorities in order to obtain jobs and participation in municipal 
budgets, a practice common amongst the guerrillas, which even forced the Government to 
freeze royalties to Arauca last year and to establish a rigorous monitoring of public 
finances in that Department’188.  
 
This paper has documented the long history of paramilitarisation of Casanare, and the 
collusion of local landowners and the armed forces of the state in that process. It has 
shown that the paramilitary have been systematically eroding civil political processes in 
Casanare for many years. The violence and extortion of other armed groups, notably the 
left guerrilla movements has also been discussed, although their influence was much 
weakened, at least in Casanare, by the beginning of the new millennium. The 
unwillingness of the paramilitary to negotiate with the state, the ongoing human rights 
abuses ( 115 persons were selectively killed in Yopal between January and March 
2004189) and the fear which grips the population190 is the outcome of accumulated policy 
failure at best and collusion at worst by the national state of Colombia.  The impact of this 
failure/collusion is felt most intensely by the civilian population. In April 2004, Amnesty 
International published its report on the human rights situation in Arauca, which since the 
history discussed at the beginning of this paper has deteriorated into one of the worst 
situations of violence in a violence-torn country191
 
In focusing just on the armed actors, the national policy context is not factored in and the 
changes demanded of the Colombian state by human rights organisations working on 
Colombia for nearly two decades are ignored. A major multinational oil corporation, BP, 
has begun to recognise the complex nature of the conflict in Casanare and the complex 
solutions it requires. They have moved away from a simplistic attribution of all the 
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region’s problems to the guerrillas of the left, while not underestimating the problem that 
they also represent. They have recognised the significance of supporting local civilians 
willing to work against corruption and for the rule of law. Will the Colombian state do the 
same? 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that a detailed case study of the interactions between oil and its 
socio-political environment can reveal much more about the relationship between oil and 
armed conflict than a focus on armed actors alone. With its relatively sophisticated 
institutional development and highly educated policy makers, the Colombian case, 
illustrates that policy failure or even policy collusion at the national level can play a 
highly significant role in the escalation of violence around a valuable natural resource. 
The corollary is that oil and armed conflict are contingent variables. Each context can 
reveal important moments when policy choices might have avoided the escalation of 
armed conflict to the point where it is almost impossible to reverse and in which oil 
provides the economic opportunity for the prolongation and intensification of that 
conflict. 
 
This case study is also important for what it reveals about the learning capacity of 
multinational oil corporations. Increasingly sensitive to reputation, seriously affected by 
the incapacity of national and local governments to provide solutions to situations of 
complex conflict in the zones they are working, wary about taking on state-like roles but 
increasingly having to confront their responsibilities as corporations, they are having to 
learn fast. BP responded to the adverse international media attention of 1996-1998 and to 
its mistakes on the ground and have come to develop a nuanced, ethical as well as 
commercial approach to the oil producing region of Colombia where they have worked 
since the end of the 1980s. They are not the only oil company to do this. In Colombia, 
Hocol was already developing a new approach to security rooted in community in the 
early 1990s; the Association of Oil Producers of Colombia has actively sought to develop 
new approaches also. But BP Amoco, with size and resources on its side, has been able to 
drive forward its approach so that today it can be claimed as a ‘ new model of corporate 
social responsibility, where private corporations work in voluntary partnership with civil 
society organisations and government authorities in a joint effort to manage social issues 
and to contribute to sustainable development’192. 
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It is always dangerous, nevertheless, to get too attached to models in complex and 
evolving social situations. This paper is not itself putting forward the BP example as a 
‘model’. Rather it is drawing attention to the innovative learning process in the 
corporation, to the commitment of its Colombian team on the ground in Casanare, and to 
its willingness to risk looking ‘beyond the perimeter fence’. The success of its new 
strategy remains fraught with daily problems and challenges and is also contingent. 
Amongst the contingencies is the willingness of the Colombian state to take its 
responsibilities to the broader citizenship of its country seriously, rather than the defence 
of an elite. It is likely that the paramilitary of Casanare will seek one day to legitimate 
wealth accumulated through violence and extortion in order to join that elite. Ethical 
corporate social responsibility requires an ethical, legitimate and law promoting national 
and local state to be truly effective. 
 
============================================================ 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
 
This paper is based on three field visits to Casanare. The first, in 1997, was by invitation of the 
UK's Inter-Agency Group involved in a dialogue with BP. I was a "participant observer" in this 
dialogue process and in a workshop in Aguazul in 1998 with all the actors in the region to discuss 
the impact of oil. I also subsequently and alongside the inter-agency group brought findings from 
the field visit in Casanare to the attention of BP personnel in Colombia and London. For the 
second visit in 2001, I was offered support by BP. I stayed in the BP base for security reasons but I 
organised my own programme and members of the company were not present when I interviewed 
people. The third visit in 2002, I stayed independently in Yopal. In the course of these three visits I 
have sought to view the problem from several angles. It was not possible for me to travel into rural 
communities, but I met many people from these communities in Yopal. I have conducted over 80 
individual interviews, and several group interviews. I am indebted to the help and support of many 
people in Casanare and Bogota for making this field research possible.  
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and Cupigua fields and which has been built slightly deeper underground than Caño Limon and has 
been subject to much few successful attacks. The fifth, the TransAndino, transports crude from 
Colombia’s Orita field in the Putumayo basin as well as Ecuadorean crude to Colombia’s Pacific prot 
at Tumaco. 
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57 Empirically based studies on the situation in  Arauca  are difficult to come by given the problems of 
field work. Andres Peñate’s unpublished Mphil dissertation was completed in 1991 before the 
escalation of the 1990s. A group from the University of Antioquia who tried to do some work in the 
department in 2001, were forced to leave after a few days. The context of my own field work in 
Casanare are outlined in the methodological note 
58 Colombia has a high distribution of revenues to oil –producing Departments and Municipalities. A 
calculation in February 2002 puts its revenue distribution on averages as 32.10% to Central 
Government, 42.7% to departments and Municipalities, 22.04% to National Royalties Fund and 2.55% 
to Social Support funds. Compared to Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, Colombia has the highest allocation 
to Departments and Municipalities and lowest to Central government in the region. In 2001, there was 
an agreement that when production takes place on indigenous lands, a share of the royalties of the 
producing departments and municipalities will be allocated to projects benefiting those communities.  , 
UNDP/World Bank, Energy Sector Management Assistance (ESMAP) Population, Energy and 
Environment Programe(PEA), Comparative analysis on the Distribution of Oil Rents , Washington, 
mimeo, February 2002  The allocation of royalties is intended to introduce some equitable distribution 
of benefits, and they must be spend on priority investiment areas such as health and education. Those 
not distributed  locally are allocated elsewhere to similar priorities  through the National Royalties 
Fund. 
59 A. Peñate, op cit. pg 43, its territory is 23,818 square kilometres, roughly the size of Wales  
60 Ibid pg 46 
61 See for example Jane Rausch, (1999) La Frontera de los Llanos en la Historia de Colombia (1830-
1930) Bogota: Banco de la República/El Áncora 
62 A. Peñate, op.cit pg 15 
63 By 1985, the Sarare region concentrated 65% of the region’s population. Ibid pg 22 
64 Along with the population of other sparsely populated provinces of the Plains area 
65 Whereas in the foothills region, 70% of the land is made up of farms of less than 50 hectres, in the 
Plains it is concentrated in farms of over 1,000 hectares.  INCORA had not undertaken land reform in 
Arauca, as similar to Casanare, the area was considered a zone of settlement. INFORA had successful 
distribution over 90% of the land titles  in the foothills area in the course of the 1980s, but conflicts 
remained in the Plains areas, and land occupations were quite frequent, led by the peasant organisation, 
ANUC.  Procuraduria General de la Nacion,et al, (1995) op cit pg 6) 
66 The settlers became very adept at organising civic strikes through the Juntas Civicas , civic councils, 
also the main vehicle for receiving resources in exchange for votes,  A. Peñate op.cit. pg 56 
67 A. Peñate, op cit. g 54. By  1989, the ELN had 850 armed men and women according to army 
intelligence and 2,300 according to the national press, with most based in Arauca and Santander, ibid 
pg 40 
68 A guerrilla strategy heavily influenced by the Cuban revolution and writings of Che Guevara and 
Regis Debray that emphasised the importance of the guerrilla army acting as a focal point for setting 
off the revolutionary momentum in the countryside. It was quite a militaristic strategy 
69 Daniel Pecaut has coined the phrase “armed clientelism”, which draws our attention to the fact that 
Arauca is by no means unique in the way violence and electoral politics have meshed with each other. 
D. Pecaut, (19  )  
70 Ibid pg 72 
71 Peñate, op cit. pg 48 
72 Ibid pg 80 
73 Ibid pg 
74 The inter-institutional commission that visited Arauca and Casanare to report on the human rights 
situation in 1995, commented “The new source of economic benefits and development of the 
departments, petroleum, has not yet brought beneficial results for the community. The most palpable 
case is that of Arauca, where the royalties for oil extraction and for the section of the Caño Limón-
Coveñas pipeline passing through the Department have been spent in public works which are not 
priorities for the communities. In some municipalities expensive and unnecessary sports centres have 
been built, and cycle tracks that no relevance to the activity of the region, to mention some examples. 
But the investment in the improvement of infrastructure (communication routes and in basic public 
services has been minimal,above all if one takes into account the atmosphere of administrative 
corruption that has traditionally surrounded the execution of public expenditure in the said 
departments”  Procuraduria General de la Nacion, et al (1995) op cit. pg 8 
75 Cusiana has reserves of around 1.5 billion barrels, and Cupiagua around 500,000 million. The 
smaller Volcanera-Florena Pauta bloc near to El Morro was found to be commercially viable 
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at the end of 1997. The production facility of a further bloc in Niscota, near the municipality 
of Nunchia was under construction by 2002. These are the confirmed areas of interest of BP. 
Other companies are exploring a total of around 30 wells in the Piedemonte, as of 1999, and 
Hocol in a consortium of companies had signed an association contract to develop another 
bloc. 
76 Prior to these discoveries, Casanare had been producing oil since 1983 in small but not insignificant 
quantitites that represented about 4.3% of national output. Dane/Instituto-Geografico Agustin Codazzi 
(1999) op.cit g 252, this oil was mostly located in the llanos, 39% in the municipality of Trinidad 
77 The human rights situation in Arauca has been well documented.  See, for example, Amnesty 
International report on Arauca April 2004, Laboratory of War 
78 The Association of which BP was the operating company was required under a 1991 regulation 
(phased out by 2000) “Special contribution for the Reestablishment of Public Order, known as the War 
Tax, to pay the Colombian Treasury on a per barrel basis. It also had an arrangement with the police 
which began in 1992, for them to guard ever BP rig. The police bore the brunt of a lot of guerilla 
attacks  on the oil installations. The Association also had a security agreement with the armed forces 
through the Ministry of Defence. This was formalised in 1995, when a three year agreement was signed 
worth US$54 million in cash and kind payments to the army. J. Pearce, (1998) Development, Conflict 
and Corporate Responsibility: The Case of Casanare, Colombia  Unpublished confidential report. 
79 The history of some of these groups goes back to the 1980s, when the drugs cartels allied with 
ranchers and businessmen and sectors of the armed forces and police to create death squads and private 
armies to eliminate guerrillas and social undesireables 
80 Between 1995 and 1997, the  Autodefensas de Cordoba y Uraba (Cordoba and Urabá Self Defense 
Groups) under Carlos Castaño led the process of Castaño, (2001)Mi Confesión   Bogotá: Editorial 
Oveja Negra building a united movement which on 18 April 1997, became the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia   (AUC) 
81 The Colombian army has a long history of human rights abuse. It was deemed responsible in 1993 
for 54% of political killings in Colombia according to the US State Department annual report on 
human rights in Colombia. Over the next few years it record apparently improved and by mid 1990s, 
only 4% of killings was attributed to it and 60% to paramilitary groups. Human Rights Watch and other 
organisations have traced the evidence on the way the army assisted operations of the paramilitary 
groups by for instance, allowing them through army blockades. Human Rights Watch (1996) 
Colombia’s Killer Networks : The military –paramilitary partnership and the United States  New York 
and Washington. Evidence of army paramilitary collaboration was clear in Casanare in my field trip in 
1998, and is recorded in my unpublished report, Development, Conflict and Coporate Responsibility: 
The Case of Casanare, Colombia  op.cit. and the few who monitor the human rights situation in 
Casanare today argue that it still continues. 
82 Calculations of the distribution of the population in these zones differ widely from each other. The 
DANE/Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi,  (1999) Casanare: Características Geogáficas  Bogota 
estimates that 40% of the population live in the low lying plains which cover 82% of the territory and 
60% in the rest.  
83 Interview with historian Ricardo Villamarin, 1/5/02 
84 A comment by Santiago Franco, advisor to the Governor of Casanare, in a meeting 30/4/02 of BP’s 
Group Gestor, 
85 Ibid pg 224  
86 Héctor Publio Pérez Ángel,  (1997) La Hacienda Caribarbare: Estructura y Relaciones de Mercado, 
1767-1810  Villavicencio: Corpes Orinoquia 
87 Pérez Angel suggests that the Indian population declined from 89,048 in 1825, to 27,700 in 1897 
Ibid pg 198. Jane Rausch cites other sources which  calculated the  Indian population  of 1835 at 6,625, 
down to  3,000 in 1914, suggesting that statistics should  be treated with caution!. Rausch, op cit. pg 
430 . There does seem to be agreement that violent conflict between Indians, cattle ranchers and 
peasant settlers from Boyaca characterised this region after Independence. By the late 1990s there were 
estimated to be only 4,786 Indians in Casanare living in ten reservations. Dpartamento Adminstrativo 
de Planeación, Gobernación de Casanare  (1998) Plan de Desarrollo, “Para Trabajar por Casanare  
Casanare, March, mimeo 
88 Peérez Angel op cit. 
89 By 2002, Recetor remained in the hands of the ELN and Chameza was controlled by the FARC. The 
guerrillas control everything in the town”, a priest who worked there for four years told me, “down to 
the peasant’s personal life”, Interview 28/4/02 
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90 Interview, Red de Solidaridad, Yopal     4/02 
91 The presence of oil in Casanare predated the large scale find of Cusiana and Cupiagua. In 1983,  
92 A study by FEDESARROLLO of the impact of oil on the Casanare economy found that neither 
african palm oil production nor ranching had declined due to oil, although plaintain, potatoes and yucca 
had suffered a decline since 1994. The two former activities are in the hands of the large landowners, 
but their survival  suggests that these powerful families did not look entirely to oil for their future. 
Fedesarrollo: Petróleo y Región, El Caso de Casanare  Bogota: 2002 
93 The 1997 report on human rights in Casanare and BP by the Defensoria del Pueblo (People’s 
Advocate’s Office) noted 30 complaints by BP of guerrilla attacks in 1996, which included the death of 
an engineer working for the Distral company. Other attacks included shooting at helicopters and during 
seismic tests. República de Colombia, Ministerio Público, Defensoria del Pueblo, Informe Derechos 
humanos en Casanare y BP (draft, mimeo, Bogota, September 1997). A Senior Security Advisor for 
BP’s operations in Casanare estimated in 1998  that there were only about 200 guerillas targeting the 
BP oil installations, Author’s Interview, June 1998. by contrast the army presence in Casanare at the 
time was around 3,000 troops. Sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment strengthened BP’s 
security enormously, enabling guerrilla movements around the BP installations to be rapidly detected. 
94 The fact that the ELN tried to intervene in these does not mean that they weren’t legitimate social 
protests in which people participated for genuine reasons not in support of the ELN tactical vision. 
Confusing all social protest with guerrilla activities is a mistake often made by the Colombian armed 
forces and paramilitary groups, and one which has led to the killing of many social activists. 
95 In the elections of 2002, the FARC threatened to leave Casanare without electricity for four years if 
the people voted for Uribe Velez, the candidate favoured by the paramilitary, and clearly the front 
runner on my arrival in Yopal shortly before the elections in April 2002. 
96 Violence in Colombia generates its own vocabulary. In Casanare, the vocabulary around cattle theft 
is very rich. There is even a word for those thieves who had the task of altering the brand on the cattle: 
cachilapero. The private guards of the cattle ranchers were the camporolantes 
97 C. Castaño, op cit. pg 199 The Procurator General (Fiscalía) reported in January 1998 on the human 
rights situation while investigating allegations against BP, he stated “Certainly in this department there 
has been a rapid expansion of paramilitary groups or private justice groups. Since 1994, in other 
investigations based in places other than Yopal, that are located on the main roads across the 
department, this Procurator General noticed some of these illegal groups. They are sustained by ranch 
and land owners, who, considering the inefficiency of the state both politically and militarily to respond 
to the guerrilla presence, find in these unchecked associations a way to defend their interests. It is no 
secret that the self-named” Self-Defense of Cordoba and Urabá” have come into the region bringing 
with them all the barbarity and inhumanity of a conflict which has turned into a series of massacres and 
selective assassinations, using techniques of a more crazy and cowardly nature, such as cutting off 
limbs of defenceless citizens, than a normal armed response to a subversive group” Fiscalia General de 
la Nación,Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Fiscalía Regional Delegada, Bogota, mimeo, 10 
Janaury 1998, pg 30 my translation. 
98 DANE-Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, op cit pg 226 
99 There were 11 confrontations in 200; in April these took place between the AUC and the 28 Front of 
the FARC in Paz de Ariporo, resulting in the death of  30 AUC members and 18 guerillas. Defensoria 
del Pueblo, (2001) Informe Relacionado con la situación de derechos humanos en el departamento del 
Casanare correspondiente al año 2,000 Agenda Para Casanare-Siglo XX1  Bogota: mimeo. Sometimes 
the FARC operates with the ELN, at others they are in mortal conflict with each other. 
100 Contradictory information exists on the paramilitary. Most people talk of two groups, although the 
the police commander Teniente Coronel Alvarez Flores suggested there are three , the third one the 
Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare that dominate the llanos and belong to the Bloque Oriental 
which includes Boyaca, Casanare, Cundinamarca and Meta.. Interview 24/8/01. The report of the 
Defensoria for the year 2,000 suggests that in October 2,000 the Frente Heroes de San Fernando, 
Bloque Centauros made an appearance in Nunchía, Pore and Paz de Aripora as well as a mobile 
company covering the region of Boyaca, Casanare, Cundinamarca and Meta. It is not surprising that 
the police chief acknowledged that he simply lacked the resources to deal with the paramilitary. “I have 
no people to arrest HK” he acknowledged . HK is a much feared member of the Autodefensas 
Campesinos del Sur, who is reported to have been arrested by accident by the army and mysteriously 
allowed to escape. 
101 Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia (2001),Estudio para identificar las necesidades de justicia y la 
viabilidad de un programme de justicia alternative en el Departamento de Casanare, contrado por laBP 
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Exploration Company (Colombia) Ltd, con la Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia. Bogota: mimeo, 
November 21st, pg 16. 
102 A.Reyes Posada, (1998 )Regionalización de los conflictos agrarios y la violencia política en 
Colombia in Libardo Sarmiento Anzola et al Municipios y Regiones de Colombia: Una mirada desde la 
Sociedad Civil Bogota:Fundación Social, pg 279, and A.Reyes Posada (1997) Compra de Tierras por 
Narcotraficantes, in F.Thoumi et al, Drogas Ilícitas en Colombia, Su impacto económico, politico y 
social Bogota: Editorial Ariel pgs 279-345 
103 It should be emphasised that even in the midst of this situation, there were those trying to build a 
different path. For instance, in the wake of major workers unrest on the african palm plantations, some 
local professionals municipality sought to prevent the violent polarisation that had accompanied agro-
industrial sectors elsewhere in Colombia. An NGO, the Fundacion para el Desarrollo de Upia was set 
up in 1987 which aimed to build dialogue between the municipality, social groups and the private 
sector and attempted to develop a regional development approach, but could not persuade the 
Departmental Governor. It has survived with great difficulty and is now participating in BP's efforts to 
build partnerships for development in the region. Interview, Ricardo Villamarin 26/4/02 
104 A number of self-defense groups took advantage of the law in 1994 authorising the legalisation of 
Rural Security Cooperatives, known as CONVIVIR, to support the state security forces in preventive, 
defensive and intelligence functions. The Autodefensas were given legal recognition which enabled 
them to organize and act more openly. The human rights abuses that were committed by the 
CONVIVIR later led to their disbandment. 
105 These details are based on interviews with local people who must remain anonymous 
106 The paramilitary have engaged in some audacious acts of recruitment, such as the kidnapping of 200 
young men from Villanueva in 2000, They have moved to create a network of informers. In 2001, all 
500 taxi drivers of Casanare had been ordered to Villanueva and told they were expected to work with 
the paramilitary. They carry out "social cleansing operations" , while in Yopal in August 2001, they 
threw a bomb into a brothel. They are responsible for human rights atrocities against anyone suspected 
of guerilla sympathies or who come from guerilla influenced territories. They carry out kidnappings 
and extortion of local oil contractors and businesses. 
107 The data is not available to make the correlation proposed by Collier and Hoeffler about the positive 
relationship between low foregone earnings and conflict, as this would involve knowing how many 
young men of what age and what schooling level join armed groups in this period. However, the 
proposition is suggestive. P.Collier and A.Hoeffler, (2001) Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 
Washington: World Bank 
108  Yopal had 14 murders in 1988 and 79 by 1998, Aguazul had only 8 in 1988. Galindo and Juaregui 
(1998) op cit. pg 123.  
109 These are figures from the Defensoria op.cit. Figures from Medicina Legal  quoted in the 
Corporación Excelencia report  of 2001 op cit pg 19, are similar, a total of  917 murders between 1997 
and 2000, a three fold increase, which made Casanare the fourth  Department  in the country for 
homicides, with an increase from 74 to 105 per 100,000 people between 1997 and 1998. 
110 Defensoria 2001 pg 10 
111 Interview, Red de Solidaridad , Yopal 2/5/02 
112 Las Asociaciones, (May 1996) Casanare 2000: Una vision del futuro 
113 Corporación Excelencia de Justicia, op cit pg 16 
114 Interview August  2001 
115 DANE (1986)Colombia Estatistica, 86  Bogota 
116 Gaviria et al (2002) Petróleo y Región: El Caso de Casanare  Bogota: Fedesarrollo pg 27.  
117 Ibid, given the evidence of the flow of internal displacement from rural area to municipal centres 
and Yopal itself, the impact on the conflict of this demographic shift should not be underestimated. 
118 F.Dureau and C.Florez (2000) Aguaitacaminamos: Las transformaciones de las ciudades de Yopal, 
Aguazul y Tauramena durante la explotación Bogota: Tercer Mundo pg25 
119 Ibid pg xviii 
120 Gaviria et al (2002) op cit pg 27 
121 Ibid pg 28.  
122 Alfredo Molano conveys the lives of the malleros in his oral history of Casanare: " I came home 
from Ibagué. There they told me about the Cusiana project. I went down there and to Tauramena…On 
the fence one suffers a lot. There are days that start without hope, others that go by without anything 
happening….Cusiana is a Disneyland, but few manage to shake hands with Mickey Mouse. At time 
goes by things become clearer: Cusiana is a vicious circle, a place from which people do not escape. 
Everyone talks of the 'boom' but if people are not living the boom, who is it for?As we are now, only 
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the trader achieves it; the opportunist is the only one that lives and enjoys it…But the other side of the 
boom, which is unknown, is that of suffering. Cusiana is also a sick worker who has to go to the well 
with a fever; it is the fifteen year old kid in love with the engineer; it is the boy hit by a tractor who is 
dying in hospital; it is the cheque sent to the wife each month so that she has everything she needs and 
then one day, he gets home and finds the clothes hanging on a peg because the lady has gone off with 
another man. Here, on the other side of the boom, you live off dreams and you hear everyone's regrets" 
A. Molana (1995) Del Llano llano, Relatos y Testimonios  Bogota: El Áncora, pgs 106-108 
123 The salario petrolero or oil wage was worth around 13,000 Colombian pesos in 1997 together with 
various perks, compared the average agricultural workers wage of between 8 and 9,000 pesos. 
Dane/Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, (1999) op cit pg 309 
124 During a workshop in Aguazul organised by Oxfam Colombia and the Colombian NGO, Censat, 
which I participated on 12 June 1998, it was clear that the population did not understand that 
employment prospects would decline when Cusiana became operational and had very high 
expectations. 
125 Gaviria et al, op cit. pg 20 
126 Interview Defensora del Pueblo, 26/4/02 
127 Interview with Gustavo Zarate, author of study 8/6/98 
128 Production of the two local agricultural crops, platano and yuca have indeed declined significantly 
since 1994, Gaviria et al, op cit pg 22 
129 Quoted in Gilberto Guzmán Celis, (1994)Cusiana o La Bonanza al Revés  Bogota: Promover 
Editores ltda, pg 125 
130 Corporacion Excelencia de Justicia, (2001) op cit pg 24 
131 The Colombian peasants association, or ANUC was initially a government sponsored organisation 
which was set up in Yopal and Aguazul in 1970. Nationally it grew into one of the country’s most 
radical social movements, in which the guerrilla organisations all tried to build influence. 
132 P.Galindo León and Marta Jauregui B. (1998) Casanare:Sueños y realidades. Inter-Agencies 
Groups, Bogota: October 1998 pg 69 
133 P. Galindo and M. Jauregui, op cit.pg 81 
134 The community came together initially to protest about a problem with a nearby oil well. BP 
responded an the community, led by Edgar Ortíz decided to organise to press for improvements in the 
village infrastructure. In this period, BP responded in a rather ad hoc fashion to such demands, but it 
encouraged the peasants to maintain their Association and seek proper social investment from the 
municipality. In 1997, the leaders requested an interview with the Commander of the 16th Brigade, 
mediated by the Defensor del Pueblo. This meeting took place on 16 March, and the words of the 
community recorded by the Defensor articulate the dilemma facing independent efforts to organise in 
Casanare’s poor communities: “In the meeting, the people explained to Lieutenant Colonel Gersain 
Sánchez Portilla, that the Municipal Adminsitration’s only response to their request for social 
investment was in some meetings to brand them as guerrillas and in others as paramilitaries. According 
to them, this situation made their lives even more difficult as the area was already classified as “red”. 
They identified themselves a peasants, members therefore of the civil population, excluded from the 
armed conflict, but they feared the consequences of this stigmatization and the understandings that it 
could generate”. The fate of Asoccocharte is emblematic of the militarization of Casanare and the 
closure of spaces for civil action. During local elections, the guerrilla moved into Union Charte and 
burnt the ballot boxes. This confirmed paramilitary and army suspicions that the village was working 
with the guerrillas. Around June 1997, paramilitaries entered the village and killed the driver of the 
local truck and owner of the local shop. In May 1998, the paramilitary returned. From evidence 
carefully collected afterwards by the Defensor, it appears that they arrived in the night, turning off the 
main Agauzul-Yopal road at the Rio Charte bridge and arrived at dawn to the village of Union Charate. 
They arrested Edgar Ortiz a companion, a local female police inspector and a mentally disturbed man 
who had fatally mistook the paramilitary for the FARC. These people were taken away around 10.30 in 
the morning when mysteriously the army blockade normally placed by the Union Charte bridge had 
been lifted to the surprise of local residents. The four were never seen again. Interview with Defensor 
del Pueblo , Yopal 12 June 1998 
135 While I cannot quantify this,the statement is based on numerous interviews with community 
organisations. Many of the women’s leaders have not stopped acting, although a number have lost 
leadership positions in the Juntas, but they are now occupying other relatively safer spaces for social 
action such as the environmental movement. On 24 November 2001, some 50 women part in an 
unprecedented march to the main square in Yopal to commerate the International Day of Non-Violence 
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Towards Women, during which they received much verbal abuse and hostility from the men in the 
town. Interview with women leaders, Yopal,   1/5/02 
136 To the best of my ability I have interviewed at length most of the actors involved in the complaints 
against BP and put their arguments to BP, and I have studied all the reports which have investigated 
BP’s role in Casanare. There are still unanswered questions around the role of BP security staff in the 
1994-1996 period, however, there is no evidence to suggest that BP was involved in the murder of 
Arrigui or the later murder in 1998 of Carlos Vargas, the President of Corporinoquia, whose murder as 
far as I could ascertain, was more likely to be linked to private family matters and threats from armed 
groups; Vargas was the brother in law of the Governor whose wife (his sister) had been kidnapped and 
later released by the ELN. He was a respected environmental campaigner whose election to the head of 
the Environmental Watchdog for the Orinoquia region, Corporinoquia. Vargas as head of Corporinoqia 
was involved in imposing fines on BP for infringements of environmental regulations, but there was no 
evidence of bad relationships between the two. It is extremely unlikely that BP would be prepared to 
collude with his assassination for these infringements. It had much more serious conflicts with other 
local leaders who have remained alive. But nor, after what happened around  Arrigui’s murder is it 
likely that BP would court further bad publicity.  I could find no grounds for thinking that BP would be 
involved in the assassination of its opponents. However, the lack of an effective judiciary makes BP 
vulnerable to many accusations which can never by fully investigated. Lawyers brought into this 
situation may without deep local knowledge of the complex often mafia like nature of the violence, 
sincerely mistrust the multinational, but the most serious problem in the Department is the generalised 
climate of impunity.  
137 Interview with Defensor who had visited the barracks and seen Soler Gomez. 
138 Defensoria del Pueblo, (1998) Informe sobre la explotación petrolera en el Casanare y Problemas 
Ambientales  Casanare, February 
139 The environmental impact of oil is a huge source of ongoing conflictivity in Casanare, in which 
genuine environmental concerns have become enmeshed in opportunistic agendas against BP.Oil does 
cause environmental problems which are a source of great concern for communities. But monitoring 
the environmental impact of an oil company is a skilled and difficult task. A number of serious NGOs 
have emerged to do this work but in very difficult circumstances. Many feel that the company does not 
take their complaints seriously while the company believes the complaints are due to lack of 
information and have promoted environmental  training. BP has a very sophisticated environmental 
programme and a very serious investment in this area, but problems inevitably arise, and in the 
situation of Casanare these can create resentment and hostility towards the company. Interviews with 
CENSAT, Mata de Monte, Aguaviva, Rodolfo Puente, Maurcio Pozos. August 2001 and April 2002 
140 Gaviria et al. op.cit. pg 16 
141 Interviews with Fanny Nuñez and other ACDAINSO leaders in 1998, 2001, 2002 
142 Human Rights Watch, (1998) Colombia: Human Rights Concerns Raised by the Security 
Arrangements of Transnational Oil Companies New York: mimeo, April. The report concluded (pg6) “ 
Oil companies that deploy security forces to protect their installations and personnel bear responsibility 
for the actions those forces undertake. In Arauca and Casanare, the army has dedicated entire brigades 
(the XV111th in Arauca and the XV1th in Casanare) to protecting oil production. The companies 
cannot ignore the human rights violations committed by those units; indeed the companies’ dependence 
on the army and police for their survival gives them a tremendous moral responsibility. In both 
departments, the army unites –albeit to different degrees – have been allegedly involved in extrajudicial 
executions which have not been resolved” 
143 Fiscalía General de la Nación, Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Fiscalia Regional 
Delegada,Bogota mimeo, 10 January 1998. The report failed to find evidence to support or refute the 
allegations against BP, leaving a margin of doubt amongst those who still felt BP had been culpable 
directly or indirectly, or had used its power to influence the Fiscalia. Further investigation of the role of 
DSC in providing illegal training in lethal weapons to the police took place. It also exonerated DSC but 
was not made public. 
144 BP has a 15% share along with Total, Ecopetrol and two Canadian companies in this pipeline which 
was completed in 1997 and runs 800 kilometers to the coast. DSC was responsible for the security of 
the pipeline and set un an Ocensa security department headed by Roger Brown. In October 1998, the 
Guardian revealed that Brown had been sacked for his dealings with an Israeli security company , 
Security Shadow. 
145 The secretary of the present Governor was kidnapped in 2001 and has still not been released. It is 
rumoured that the paramilitary are holding her as some kind of hostage.  
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146 CRECE,(1995) Construcción de un Sistema de Cuentas Economicas y Sociales para Casanare 
Informe Final, Manizales: December , mimeo,  pg 4 
147 Ibid pg 35 The decrease in Arauca’s production that year and in 2001 due to the pipeline bombing 
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